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MADONNAS AND WHORES IN THE WORKPLACE
JESSICA FINK*
ABSTRACT
Much has been written about lookism the preferential treat-
ment given to those who conform to societal standards of beauty.
But in a recent case before the Iowa Supreme Court,a sexdiscrimi-
nation plaintiff alleged reverse-lookism, claiming that her male
employer terminated her long-term employment because she was
too physically attractive,thus tempting the employer to consider en-
tering into an extramarital affair.To the great surprise of many
who followed this case,the Iowa Supreme Court sided with the em-
ployer,declining to find him liable for sexdiscrimination.As one
might expect,uproar ensued,with the media,the public,and the
academic community eviscerating the court for its failure to recog-
nize and rectify sexdiscrimination.In story after story,reporters,
academics,and pundits framed this decision as one involving an
irresistible woman and a mans uncontrollable lust. Though such
characterizations made for catchy headlines,they were not quite
true: The courts decision did not hinge upon outmoded stereotypes
regarding gender roles,but rather contained a plausible factual and
legal basis for denying the plaintiffs claim.
This Article expounds on the decision of the Iowa Supreme Court,
exploring the complicated reasons behind this employees failure to
win her case,and suggesting alternate theories under which a simi-
larly situated employee could successfully challenge this type of
termination.The Article also probes the reasons behind the vehe-
ment,and often misinformed,public reaction to this case.It explores
the ways in which the media systematically misrepresents women,
particularly in the context of suits involving workplace sexdiscrimi-
nation,and examines the consequences of these errors,arguing that
attempts to force women in the public eye into one of two molds
either pure and pristine with muted sexuality,or sexually promiscu-
ous and vilified has dramatic consequences for other employees in
the workplace,for policymakers,and for the public at large.
* Professor of Law,California Western School of Law.J.D.,Harvard Law School,
2001;B.A.,University of Michigan,1997.I am grateful to my colleagues at California
Western School of Law for their input regarding an earlier draft of this Article and spe-
cifically to Vice Dean Barbara Coxfor her insightful comments and suggestions.Many
thanks also to Mallory Holt for her excellent and thorough research assistance.
255
256 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol.22:255
INTRODUCTION
I. TOO HOT FOR THE WORKPLACE:NELSON AND HER
COUNTERPARTS
A. Nelson v.Knight: Fired for Being Too Hot for Her Job?
B. Other Employees Who Have Claimed to Be Too Hot for
Their Jobs
II. ANOTHER PATH?HOW NELSON AND OTHER ATTRACTIVE
EMPLOYEESMIGHT PREVAIL IN SIMILAR CASES
A. The Missing Harassment Claim as One Possible Route to
Future Success
B. The Attractive Employee as a Victim of Gender
Stereotyping: Applying Price Waterhouse to the
Too Hot Employee
III.THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN MISREPRESENTING THESE CASES:
THE QUEST TO MAINTAIN THE MADONNA-WHOREPARADIGM
A. Snapshot of a Hyperbolic Media
B. Sexiness Sells: The Medias Sensationalism Bias
C. Bias on Steroids: The Need for a Script in Stories
Involving Women
D. A Perfect Storm: Media Sensationalism & Gender
Stereotyping Leads to Skewed Reporting in Sex
Discrimination Cases
IV.HIGH STAKES ERRORS:THE RAMIFICATIONS OF MEDIA BIAS IN
STORIES INVOLVING WORKPLACE SEX DISCRIMINATION
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
Appearance matters. In a variety of settings social, profes-
sional, academic, and even familial a persons physical appearance
impacts the treatment that he or she receives:conventional wisdom
dictates that the beautiful people come out on top in these inter-
actions that those who comport with accepted standards of physi-
cal attractiveness generally receive preferential treatment.1 Yet in
a recent case before the Iowa Supreme Court,Nelson v. Knight,2 a
1.See infra note 11and associated text.
2.834N.W.2d 64(Iowa 2013).Notably,this was the second opinion that the Iowa
Supreme Court issued in this case.In December 2012,the Iowa Supreme Court first issued
a decision affirming summary judgment to Knight.Nelson v.Knight,2012WL 6652747,
at *1(Iowa 2012).As discussed in greater detail below,the Iowa Supreme Court subse-
quently withdrew this initial decision and issued a second opinion in July 2013,in response
to a petition for rehearing,but did so without any oral argument or re-briefing.Nelson,
834N.W.2d at 65n.1;see also Jonathan Turley,The Irresistible Woman Meets the Incor-
rigible Court: Iowa Supreme Court Issues New Opinion Upholding Firing in Irresistible
Attraction Case, JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (July 15,2013),http://jonathanturley.org/2013
/07/15/the-irresistible-woman-meets-the-incorrigible-court-iowa-supreme-court-issues
-new-opinion-upholding-firing-in-irresistible-attraction-case[http://perma.cc/2SG9-HS9C].
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plaintiff attempted to turn this conventional wisdom on its head,
claiming that her married,male employer terminated her long-term
employment because she was a woman and too physically attractive,
thus tempting the employer to consider entering into an extramari-
tal affair with her.3To prove her case,the plaintiff not only cited her
former employers admission that he fired Nelson because their
relationship had become a detriment to [his] family,4 but also pro-
vided evidence of numerous graphic and sexual comments that
Knight had made to her during her employment5 comments that
Knight did not deny making.6 Despite this evidence,however,the
Iowa Supreme Court rejected the plaintiffs claim, declining to find
Knight liable for sexdiscrimination.7According to the court,Nelson
was not terminated due to her sex,but rather due to the consensual
relationship between herself and Knight a reason that was not
deemed to be because of a gender-specific characteristic . . . .8
In the wake of this decision,observers from all facets of the legal
and social landscape responded with ire:the media,the public,and
the academic community all leveled harsh criticism at this coinci-
dentally, all-male Iowa Supreme Court for its apparent failure to
recognize and rectify sexdiscrimination.9In story after story,report-
ers,academics and pundits framed this decision as one involving an
irresistible woman and a mans uncontrollable lust.10 Though
this ire created a convenient story for the press and a compelling
way of framing this case it ultimately was a misleading account of
the courts decision. The Iowa Supreme Courts decision did not
hinge upon outmoded stereotypes regarding gender roles,but rather
contained a plausible factual and legal basis for denying the plain-
tiffs claim.
3.See Nelson, 834N.W.2d at 66.
4.Id.
5.Id. at 6566.
6.Id.
7.Id. at 65.
8.Id.
9.See infra Section III.A. The word sex generally refers to an individuals biological
identity, whereas the word gender generally refers to an individuals social identity
(including culturally traditional masculine and/or feminine characteristics). See, e.g.,
Francine TilewickBazluke & Jeffrey J.Nolan,Because of Sex: The Evolving Legal Riddle
of Sexual vs. Gender Identity, 32J.C.& U.L.361,362(2006).Courts,however,have fre-
quently failed to properly distinguish between these two concepts,deeming such distinc-
tions unnecessary under Title VII.See id. at 365(quoting Hopkins v.Baltimore Gas &
Elec.Co.,77F.3d 745,749n.1(4th Cir.1996))(Because Congress intended that the term
sex in Title VII mean simply man or woman, there is no need to distinguish between
the terms sex and gender in Title VII cases.). Whereas some academic writers have ad-
vocated for maintaining a distinction between these two terms,this Article does not com-
ment on any ambiguity in the use of these terms in the court decisions cited herein.See id.
10.See infra Section III.A.
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So why did everyone get this case so wrong?How did so many
experts in the field and so many members of the media misunder-
stand,or perhaps willfully misrepresent,the nuanced reasons behind
Nelsons failure to win her case? This Article not only reexamines
the facts at issue in Nelson and tries to frame the outcome of this
case in a more logical and defensible light,but also endeavors to
understand the reasons for the often-flawed coverage of this lawsuit.
Part I of this Article provides a more thorough description of the
Nelson case, explaining the courts decision not in the simplistic and
divisive terms adopted by the media and others in the wake of this
ruling,but rather by citing the legal precedent and factual basis for
the result.Part I also places this case in context by discussing other
examples of women who have claimed they were penalized for being
too attractive for their workplaces. Part II builds upon this broader
context by examining how plaintiffs,like Nelson,who believe that
theyhave been terminated due to their (attractive)appearance,might
prevail in bringing sexdiscrimination claims,by providing several
theories under which such plaintiffs might succeed.Part III exam-
ines the medias role in the Nelson case,looking at the reasons behind
the vehement and often misinformed public reaction that this law-
suit generated.Part IV explores the ways in which the media system-
atically misrepresents women,particularly in the context of suits
involving workplace sexdiscrimination.It argues that women in the
public eye ultimately are forced into one of two molds either pure
and pristine with muted sexuality,or sexually promiscuous and
vilified.This Article argues that creating and perpetuating this false
dichotomy has dramatic,negative consequences not only for women
in the workplace,but also for other employees,for policymakers,
and for the public at large.
I.TOO HOT FOR THE WORKPLACE:NELSON AND HER COUNTERPARTS
Most individuals do not complain about suffering harm due to
being too attractive. Indeed, quite the opposite typically is true:
study after study has revealed the advantages both in and out of the
workplace for individuals who meet societys definition of beauty.11
For example,studies show that we ascribe a host of positive traits
to physically attractive individuals,assuming that such individuals
11.See William R.Corbett,Hotness Discrimination: Appearance Discrimination as
a Mirror for Reflecting on the Body of Employment-Discrimination Law, 60CATH.U.L.
REV.615,625 (2011);Enbar Toledano,The Looking-Glass Ceiling: Appearance-Based
Discrimination in the Workplace, 19CARDOZO WOMENS L.J.683(2013);see also Michael
Kimmel,Fired for Being Beautiful, N.Y.TIMES,July 17,2013,at A25;cf. Ashley Robin
Brown,Mirror, Mirror on the Wall, Who Are You to Say Who Is Fairest of Them All?,13
VA.SPORTS & ENT.L.J.54,57(2013)(examining the weaknesses in the argument that
more attractive individuals enjoy greater advantages).
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[are] happier, possess more socially desirable personalities, practice
more prestigious occupations,and exhibit higher marital compe-
tence.12 We view beautiful people as more competent and more
socially graceful than their less attractive peers.13 Physically at-
tractive individuals tend to have more friends,more sex,and more
money than those who lacksuch beauty.14
This beauty advantage often becomes particularly pronounced
in the workplace.Employers tend to hire physically attractive job
candidates more frequently than their less attractive peers and offer
higher starting salaries to these more attractive individuals.15Once
on the job,attractive employees continue to garner benefits:they
generally receive more favorable performance reviews,16 receive
higher pay,17 and receive promotions at a more frequent rate than
their less attractive counterparts.18Attractive employees thus seem
to climb the corporate ladder more quickly than their peers,placing
one (well-manicured)foot in front of the other in a manner that may
seem effortless to the casual observer.
This prevailing wisdom makes it easy to dismiss complaints like
those lodged by Nelson complaints that her gender, and by exten-
sion,her physical beauty,placed her at a disadvantage in the work-
place,and ultimately led to her termination.19Yet in both Nelson and
in other similar cases,female employees have tried to allege unlaw-
ful sex discrimination on precisely this basis,arguing that they
received adverse treatment for being too attractive for their jobs.
A. Nelson v.Knight: Fired for Being Too Hot for Her Job?
In 1999,Melissa Nelson began working as a dental hygienist for
Iowa dentist James Knight.20 Over the course of the next decade,
12.Toledano,supra note 11,at 692;see also Corbett,supra note 11, at 625 (Recent
research indicates that there is a high correlation between beauty and happiness,with
a significant part of the happiness attributable to the beautiful persons higher earnings,
and the higher earnings of the beautiful persons beautiful spouse.); Toledano, supra
note 11, at 683 ([W]e not only value beauty in the abstract,but we also generally believe
that beautiful people are, in fact, better people.).
13.Kimmel,supra note 11.
14.Id.;see also Brown,supra note 11,at 57(discussing the advantages of physical
attractiveness,including higher earnings).
15.See Toledano,supra note 11,at 684,694.
16.See id. at 694.
17.See Kimmel,supra note 11 (citing one economic study that found a 5 percent
bonus for employees who fall within the top third of the looks department (as assessed
by a set of observers), as compared to a 7 to 9 percent penalty for those in the bottom
nine percent).
18.See Toledano,supra note 11,at 684.
19.See Nelson v.Knight,834N.W.2d 64,67(Iowa 2013).
20.Id. at 65.
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Nelson and Knight enjoyed a collegial relationship:Nelson appar-
ently performed her workduties well,and Knight treated Nelson with
respect and integrity.21 According to Nelson,however,in or around
2009,her relationship with Knight underwent changes.22 Knight
began to complain about the clothing that Nelson wore to work,de-
scribing it as too tight, revealing, and distracting.23 He told
Nelson that it was not good for [him] to see [Nelson] wearing things
that accentuate her body.24Knight and Nelson also began sending
text messages to each other regarding both work and personal
matters.25Both parties apparently played a role in initiating these
text messages, and neither one ever objected to the others text mes-
sages.26 Though many of these messages involved innocuous is-
sues such as discussions regarding their childrens activities the
messages eventually took on a more sexual tone.27 Knight told
Nelson that if she saw his pants bulging, she would know her
clothing was too revealing,28and he texted Nelson to askhow often
she experienced orgasms.29When Nelson once commented about the
infrequency of her sex life, Knight told her, [T]hats like having a
Lamborghini in the garage and never driving it.30 Though Knight
initiated the sexual content in these exchanges,Nelson apparently
never asked Knight not to text her nor indicated that she was of-
fended by these conversations.31Nelson also admitted that she once
texted Knight to tell him that [t]he only reason I stay is because of
you,32and she admitted that a coworker was jealous of the manner
in which Nelson and Knight got along.33
Knights wife who also worked in her husbands dental prac-
tice eventually discovered that her husband and Nelson had been
texting each other.34 Stating that she viewed Nelson as a big threat
to our marriage, Mrs. Knight demanded that her husband termi-
nate Nelsons employment.35 After considering his wifes request and
conferring with their pastor,Knight eventually fired Nelson,telling
21.See id.
22.See id.
23.Id. (internal quotations omitted).
24.Id. (internal quotations omitted).
25.Nelson, 834N.W.2d at 65.
26.Id.
27.See id. at 6566.
28.Id. at 66.
29.Id.
30.Id. (internal quotations omitted).
31.See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 6566.
32.Id. at 6566. (internal quotations omitted).
33.Id. at 65.
34.Id. at 66.
35.Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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Nelson that their relationship had become a detriment to [his] family
and that for the best interests of [himself]and his family and Nel-
son and her family, the two of them should not work together.36
When later pressed by Nelsons husband, Knight admitted that Nelson
was the best dental assistant he ever had,37 and he acknowledged
that Nelson had not done anything wrong or inappropriate . . . .38
He also said that he was worried he was getting too personally at-
tached to [Nelson], and that he feared he would try to have an affair
with her down the road if he did not fire her.39
Nelson sued Knight under Section 216.6(1)(a)of the Iowa Code,
which prohibits an employer from discharging any employee be-
cause of that employees sex.40 Just as under the comparable anti-
discrimination language found within Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (Title VII),41 the court noted that its inquiry involved
determining whether sex was a motivating factor in any adverse
action taken against the plaintiff.42 Knight argued that Nelsons sex
was not a motivating factor in her termination:he said that the nature
of his relationship with Nelson and the threat this relationship posed
to his marriage, rather than Nelsons sex, were his motivations for
terminating her employment.43Nelson,in contrast,adopted the view
that neither this relationship nor the alleged threat it imposed
would have existed if she had not been a woman.44
In December 2012and July 2013,the Iowa Supreme Court issued
decisions affirming summary judgment for Knight.45 In rendering
these decisions,the Iowa Supreme Court drew upon cases that pre-
viously declined to find gender discrimination when employers had
36.Id.
37.Nelson,834N.W.2d at 66.
38.Id.
39.Id.
40.Id. at 67.As discussed in greater detail below,Nelson asserted only a sexdiscrimi-
nation claim related to her termination.See infra notes 6466, 100115 and accompanying
text.She did not assert any claim of sexual harassment,despite the sexual and often
graphic nature of Knights texts to her. Nelson,834N.W.2d at 67.
41.The Nelson court noted that in evaluating discrimination claims under Iowa Code
Chapter 216,the court looks to federal law as guidance,including Title VII.Nelson, 834
N.W.2d at 67.
42.Id. (emphasis added) (Generally, an employer engages in unlawful sexdiscrim-
ination when the employer takes adverse employment action against an employee and
sex is a motivating factor in the employers decision.).
43.Id.
44.Id.
45.As described in greater detail above (see supra note 2and accompanying text),the
court initially issued a decision in December 2012,and then issued another opinion in
July 2013, which withdrew the courts first opinion and which was substituted as the
opinion of the court.Whereas the differences between the two opinions issued by the court
are discussed in greater detail later in this Article,the analysis in this section focuses on
the courts reasoning in its second, July 2013 opinion,as that remains the opinion of record.
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fired female employees who were involved in consensual personal
relationships that may have triggered some jealousy in others.46
According to the court, it did not matter that the relationships and
the jealousy that resulted likely would not have existed if the
[plaintiffs] had been male.47In one Eighth Circuit case relied upon
by the Nelson court,for example,a male business owner had fired
a female employee because the owners wife saw this employee as a
threat to her marriage.48Citing authority that previously had recog-
nized that sexual favoritism does not violate Title VII,49the Eighth
Circuit opined that if instances of sexual favoritism did not violate
Title VII (i.e.,because such decisions resulted from conduct rather
than gender), then treating an employee unfavorably because of this
type of special relationship likewise would not violate the law.50The
Eighth Circuit held that employment decisions that are made based
upon consensual sexual relationships should not be seen as flowing
from the gender of the parties,but rather as flowing from the rele-
vant employees conduct.51
Whereas the district court in Nelson deemed this Eighth Circuit
precedent persuasive,Nelson attempted to distinguish her situation:
she argued that in the Eighth Circuit case,the plaintiff-employee
had played an active role in creating and encouraging the threaten-
ing relationship with her employer by pinching his rear end and
writing him notes of a sexual [and] intimate nature.52 Nelson,in
contrast,claimed that she had done nothing to create her precarious
workplace situation,never flirting with Knight or initiating any sort
of sexual or intimate relationshipwith him.53 In Nelsons eyes, she was
guilty of little more than simply exist[ing] as a female at work.54
46.Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 6768.
47.See id. at 67.
48.Id. at 6768 (citing Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 90506 (8th
Cir.2006)).
49.Id. at 68;see also id. at 79n.13(Cady,J.,concurring)(citing precedent that held
that, [Romantically motivated] favoritism is not based on a belief that women are better
workers,or otherwise deserve to be treated better,than men;indeed,it is entirely consis-
tent with the opposite opinion.) (parentheticals in original)(internal quotations omitted).
50.Id. at 68.This line of cases assumed,however,that the conduct in question did
not result from unwelcome sexual advances or [other aspects of] a hostile work en-
vironment. Id.
51.Id.
52.See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 6768 (internal quotations omitted).
53.Id. at 65.
54.Id. at 69(internal quotations omitted);see also id. at 65(framing the question for
the court as whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious conduct may be
lawfully terminated simply because the bosss spouse views the relationship between the
boss and the employee as a threat to her marriage) (emphasis added). The court also
discussed an Eleventh Circuit opinion,Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc.,where
a male business owner terminate[d] a female employee who worked on the same crew
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The Iowa Supreme Court, however, rejected Nelsons argument.55
Upholding the district courts grant of summary judgment for Knight,
the court found a distinction between an employment decision based
on personal relations, like that between Knight and Nelson (assum-
ing that there was no coercion or quid pro quo involved), and a
decision based on gender itself.56 According to the court,this dis-
tinction would exist even when the personal relationship at issue
would not have arisen had the employee . . . been of the opposite
gender . . . .57 In other words,even if it was likely that Knight
would not have developed a personal relationshipwith Nelson had she
been a male employee and even if Knights wife may not have be-
come jealous of a close relationship between her husband and a male
employee termination based upon this relationship and the jeal-
ousy it caused was not the same as termination based upon gender.
The Chief Justice of the Iowa Supreme Court,concurring in the
result, elaborated on this point, asserting that although differential
treatment based on an employees status as a woman constitutes sex
discrimination ...differential treatment on account of conduct re-
sulting from the sexual affiliations of an employee does not form the
basis for a sex-discrimination claim.58The Chief Justice thus noted
that an adverse employment consequence experienced by an em-
ployee because ofa voluntary,romantic relationship does not form the
basis of a sex-discrimination suit59and emphasized that this rule ex-
tended beyond relationships with actual sexual intimacy to include
consensual affiliations involving sexually suggestive conduct.60
Applying this analysis to the instant case,the Chief Justice found
that whereas the absence of sexually suggestive behavior on the
as the business owners son, after the wife of [this] son became . . . jealous of [the female
employee]. Id. at 69(citing Platner v.Cash & Thomas Contractors,Inc.,908F.2d 902,
903(11th Cir.1990)).Just as Nelson claimed in her case,the female employee in Platner
had not played an active role in fostering anyones jealousy, yet the Eleventh Circuit still
declined to find the defendant liable for gender discrimination.See id. (It is evident that
Thomas,faced with a seemingly insoluble conflict within his family,felt he had to make
a choice as to which employee to keep.He opted to place the burden ...on Platner,to
whom he was not related . . . . [T]he ultimate basis for Platners dismissal was not
gender but simply favoritism for a close relative.) (quoting Platner,908F.2d at 905)).
55.See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 7073.
56.Id. at 70;see also id. at 75(Cady,J.,concurring)(noting that differential treatment
based on an employees status as a woman constitutes sex discrimination, while differen-
tial treatment on account of conduct resulting from the sexual affiliations of an employee
does not form the basis for a sex-discrimination claim).
57.Id. at 67,70.
58.Nelson,834N.W.2d at 75(Cady,J.,concurring).
59.Id. (Cady,J.,concurring).
60.Id. at 7576 (Cady, J., concurring) (When employees are terminated due to con-
sensual,romantic or sexually suggestive relationships with their supervisors,courts gener-
ally conclude the reason does not amount to sex discrimination . . . .).
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part of Nelson,does factually distinguish this case from ...cases
[rejecting sex-discrimination claims]based on a consensual,roman-
tic relationship,61 the threat to the Knights marriage here still re-
sulted from the consensual personal relationship between Nelson
and Knight.62Accordingly,he found no evidence indicating that either
the relationship between Knight and Nelson or the decision to ter-
minate Nelson flowed from sex-based animus.63
Significantly,both the majority and concurring justices in Nelson
tookgreat pains to emphasize the very limited nature of their deci-
sion (particularly in their second,July 2013opinion).64For example,
the court repeatedly highlighted Nelsons failure to assert a sexual
harassment claim in this case a decision that the court seemed to
find surprising given the nature of Knights graphic communica-
tions with Nelson.65 Indeed,at several points throughout the opin-
ion,the court implied that had Nelson alleged sexual harassment,
the court might have reached a different conclusion in this case.66
Moreover,in finding no gender discrimination related to Nel-
sons termination, the court made much of the consensual nature of
the relationship between Knight and Nelson,including within both
61.Id. at 79(Cady,J.,concurring);see also id. at 80 (Cady, J., concurring) ([A] critical
aspect of the entire analysis centers on the consensual and voluntary nature of the per-
sonal relationship.).
62.See id. at 79(Cady,J.,concurring).
63.Id. (Cady,J.,concurring).
64.See Nelson,834N.W.2d at 65(stating,in the opinions opening lines, [w]e em-
phasize the limits of our decision.).
65.See id. at 72n.7(observing that although the record indicates that Dr. Knight
made a number of inappropriate comments toward Nelson that are of a type often seen
in sexual harassment cases ...Nelson does not allege ...that she was a victim of sexual
harassment); see also id. at 65 (The employee did not bring a sexual harassment or
hostile workenvironment claim;we are not deciding how such a claim would have been
resolved in this or any other case.);id. at 67 (Nelson does not contend that her employer
committed sexual harassment.); id. at 78 (Cady,J.,concurring)(acknowledging that
Knights comments would commonly be viewed as inappropriate in most any setting and,
for sure,beyond the reasonable parameters of workplace interaction, but noting that they
nevertheless were an undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship enjoyed
by Nelson and Dr. Knight).
66.See id. at 65(clarifying that the court was not deciding how a sexual harassment
or hostile work environment claim would be resolved on these facts); see also id. at 72
n.7 (indicating that inappropriate comments like those made by Knight in this case
frequently support sexual harassment claims).Other observers of this case more explicitly
questioned Nelsons decision not to allege harassment in the wake of the courts decisions.
See Press-Citizen Editorial Board, Firing Just for Being Too Hot Is Discrimination,
IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN (Dec.29,2012,3:20 PM),https://archive.presscitizen.com
/article/20130103/OPINION03/301030003/Our-View-Firing-being-too-hot-discrimination
[http://perma.cc/7FR5-U6NA](responding to the initial opinion issuedby the IowaSupreme
Court, stating we cant understand why Nelson filed suit based on gender discrimi-
nation rather than sexual harassment.It seems she could have made a stronger case for
Knight having created a hostile work environment.).
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the majority and concurring opinion,reams of references to this con-
sensual relationship andspecifically noting that it would have reached
a different conclusion had Nelsons relationship with Knight not
been consensual.67 The Chief Justice characterized the consensual
nature of this relationship as a critical aspect of the [courts] entire
analysis,68 deeming the consensual aspect of [the] relationship to
be pivotal to the analysis of the claim of discrimination based on a
67.See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65 (We emphasize the limits of our decision.The
employee did not bring a sexual harassment or hostile workenvironment claim;we are
not deciding how such a claim would have been resolved in this or any other case.); see
also id. at 65 (observing that [b]oth parties initiated texting and that [n]either ob-
jected to the others texting);id. at 66 (relaying Nelsons admission that she [did] not
remember ever telling Dr.Knight not to text her nor indicated that she found his texts
offensive);id. at 67 (citing precedent that [A]n employer does not engage in unlawful
gender discrimination by discharging a female employee who is involved in a consensual
relationship that has triggered personal jealousy) (emphasis added);id. at 70(finding
a distinction between decisions based upon gender and an isolated employment decision
based on personal relations (assuming no coercion or quid pro quo)) (emphasis added);
id. (relying on federal case law to establish that adverse employment action stemming
from a consensual workplace relationship (absent sexual harassment)is not actionable
under Title VII) (emphasis added); see also Nelson,834 N.W.2d.at 75 (Cady,J.,con-
curring) (articulating the general legal principle that an adverse employment consequence
experienced by an employee because of a voluntary,romantic relationship does not form
the basis of a sex-discrimination suit, whether the relationship involves sexual intimacy
or simply sexually suggestive conduct)(emphasis added);id. at 76(Cady,J.,concurring)
(When employees are terminated due to consensual,romantic or sexually suggestive
relationships with their supervisors,courts generally conclude the reason does not
amount to sex discrimination because the adverse employment consequence is based
upon sexual activity rather than gender.) (emphasis added); id. at 78(Cady,J.,concur-
ring) (The fact of the matter is Nelson was terminated because of the activities of her
consensual personal relationship with her employer, not because of her gender.) (emphasis
added);id. (Cady,J.,concurring)(referencing the consensual personal relationship
between Knight and Nelson and observing that this relationship extended well beyond the
workplace); id. (Cady,J.,concurring)(characterizing Knights sexual banter as an un-
deniable part of the consensual personal relationship enjoyed by Nelson and Dr. Knight.);
id. at 79 (Cady, J., concurring) ([A] sex discrimination claim predicated on physical ap-
pearance accompanied by a consensual personal relationship between the employee and
employer requires proof that the physical appearance of the plaintiff was a gender-based
reason for the adverse employment action.) (emphasis added); Nelson,834 N.W.2d at
7980 (Cady, J., concurring) (noting that [t]he relationship ...included enough activity
and conduct to support a determination ...that Nelson was terminated as a response
to the consensual personal relationship she maintained with Dr. Knight, and that there
was insufficient evidence tending to show that Nelsons status as a woman was also a
motivating reason);id. at 80 (Cady, J., concurring) (It is important to observe that a
critical aspect of the entire analysis centers on the consensual and voluntary nature of the
personal relationship.);id. (Cady, J., concurring) ([T]he consensual aspect of a rela-
tionship is pivotal to the analysis of the claim of discrimination based on a personal
relationship.In this case,it is undisputed the relationship was consensual.);id. at 8081
(Cady, J., concurring) (There was insufficient evidence offered by Nelson in light of the
undisputed evidence of a consensual personal relationship that would permit a reason-
able fact finder to conclude ...that Dr.Knight terminated Nelson based on her status
as a woman.).
68.Id. at 80(Cady,J.,concurring).
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personal relationship.69The court made clear that it was this consen-
sual relationship conduct on the part of both Knight and Nelson
that formed the basis for Nelsons termination, and not merely
Nelsons sex or existence as a female.70 Neither Nelsons appear-
ance nor her sexalone were enough to get her fired;rather,it was
the manifestation of her attractive,feminine appearance in a con-
sensual personal relationship with Knight a relationship that
evoked jealousy in Knights wife that led to her termination.
B. Other Employees Who Have Claimed to Be Too Hot for    
Their Jobs
Nelson is not alone in claiming to have suffered adverse treat-
ment at workdue to her attractive appearance.Indeed,despite the
fact that Nelsons claim seemed to fly in the face of extensive research
that has shown the workplace advantages of physical beauty,71other
employees similarly have claimed to have experienced adverse treat-
ment due to their good looks:in 2009,for example,a banker named
Debrahlee Lorenzana was fired from her position at Citibank,a ter-
mination that Lorenzana claimed was due to her curvaceous figure
and her propensity to dress in a manner that accentuated her body.72
In the lawsuit that she filed against her former employer which ulti-
mately was dismissed due to the presence of an arbitration agree-
ment73 Lorenzana claimed that her superiors had asked her to
refrain from wearing various items of clothing (including turtleneck
tops,pencil skirts,fitted business suits,and other tailored clothing)
because as a result of the shape of her figure, such clothes were
purportedly too distracting for her male colleagues and supervisors
69.Id. (Cady,J.,concurring).
70.See id. at 78(Cady,J.,concurring).
71.See Brown,supra note 11,at 57(specifying that attractive individuals have less
difficulty securing employment,receive benefits and opportunities because of their
attractiveness,and ultimately have a greater earning potential);Corbett,supra note 11,
at 625(indicating a positive correlation between an individuals level of attractiveness
and their earnings);Toledano,supra note 11,at 694(stating that attractive individuals
are perceived as more capable employees,receive better salaries,and are evaluated more
favorably than less attractive co-workers);Kimmel,supra note 11(declaring that studies
indicate that attractive individuals receive many workplace benefits,including bonuses
whereas less attractive workers receive penalties for their appearances).
72.See Complaint at 2, Lorenzana v. Citigroup Inc., 2009 WL 4241578, *23 (N.Y.
Sup.Ct.Nov.20,2009)(No.09116382)[hereinafter Lorenzana Complaint];see also Ed
Pilkington,New York Banker Claims She Was Fired for Being Attractive, THE GUARDIAN
(June 4,2010,11:57AM),http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/jun/04/debrahlee-loren
zana-too-distracting-lawsuit [http://perma.cc/5QTK-HVWQ];Corbett,supra note 11,at
616,619.
73.Corbett,supra note 11,at 620;see also Docket Entry,Lorenzana v.Citigroup Inc.,
No.116382/2009(N.Y.Sup.Ct.Feb.2,2010).
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to bear.74Moreover,Lorenzana alleged that,in response to her com-
plaints that other female employees wore these prohibited clothing
items,Citigroup management had advised Lorenzana that the other
female employees could wear what they wished because [their]
general unattractiveness rendered moot their sartorial choices,75
whereas Lorenzana could not allow her shapeliness to be height-
ened by beautifully tailored clothing.76
Similarly,in Willingham v. Regions Bank, the plaintiff also an
attractive female banker claimed to have been terminated due to
her attractive appearance and argued that her termination consti-
tutedsexdiscrimination.77 Willinghams employer, in contrast, claimed
that she was terminated for violating the companys Code of Con-
duct after she appeared in a publication as Ms. Cruzin South
August 2008, on both the cover and in photos wearing a bikini and
sitting on motorcycles and cars,and then distributed copies of this
magazine at work.78 In alleging that her termination resulted from
sexdiscrimination,79 Willingham argued,inter alia, that the bank
treated her in a different,more negative manner than a similarly
situated male employee.80 She specifically pointed to a photograph
of a male employee who had not been fired after appearing shirtless
and dressed in skimpy running shorts on a web site related to a
road race.81 The court,however,rejected her claim,granting sum-
mary judgment in favor of the bank.82
In 2010,Amy-Erin Blakely,a former assistant executive director
at a nonprofit organization called The DevereuxFoundation,sued
her former employer for sexdiscrimination after her termination by
the nonprofit.83 Before being terminated,Blakely had filed two
internal grievances against her employer alleging adverse treat-
ment due to her attractive physical appearance.84Among her allega-
tions,Blakely claimed that,prior to her termination,she had been
told that other employees could not concentrate in meetings with
74.Lorenzana Complaint,supra note 72,at 2;Pilkington,supra note 72.
75.Lorenzana Complaint,supra note 72,at 3.
76.Id.
77.2010WL 2650727,at *13 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
78.Id. at *12, *4.
79.See id. at *2.
80.See id. at *5.
81.Id. (internal quotations omitted).
82.Id. at *56.
83.See, e.g.,Lisa Johnson Mandell,Amy-Erin Blakely Busts Devereux Foundation
with Large Breasts Lawsuit, AOL JOBS (Nov.17,2010,5:42 PM),http://jobs.aol.com
/articles/2010/11/17/amy-erin-blakely-busts-devereux-foundation-with-large-breasts-la
[http://perma.cc/TF24-HE6G].
84.See id.
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her because all they saw were her big breasts;85 that she had been
nicknamed Big Tittie Baby;86 that a high level executive [wanted]
to play tennis with her so ...he could [see]her in [a]tennis skirt
and see her big titties bouncing around;87 and that she was too
sensual for promotion into the position of executive director, among
other comments.88
Notably,these types of claims by female plaintiffs alleging
adverse treatment due to their attractive physical appearance seem
not to be limited to the corporate workplace.Even employees who
workat job sites where one would expect tolerance (and perhaps even
a preference)for physical attractiveness or sensual attire have com-
plained of discrimination based upon their good looks:in 2012,for
example,a data entry employee at a wholesale lingerie company
claimed to have been fired one weekinto her employment due to her
busty figure and allegedly racy attire.89 The employee claimed that
she was asked to tape her breasts down to make them look smaller
and that she was told that she was just too hot for this office90
despite her assertion that her wardrobe was appropriate for a busi-
ness that sells thongs with hearts placed in the female genital area
and boy shorts for women that say hot in the buttocks area.91
Similarly,in 2013,a New Yorkyoga teacher claimed that she was
fired from a husband-and-wife-owned chiropractic clinic where she
worked after the husband told the employee that his wife might
become jealous of her on account of being too cute.92
85.Id.
86.Id.
87.Id.
88.Id. (internal quotations omitted).The parties eventually settled this case after
it was removed to federal court.Notice of Removal at 5,Blakely v.The DevereuxFound.,
Inc.,No.6:10-cv-01808-MSS -KRS (M.D.Fl.Dec.6,2010);see also Mediation Report at
1,Blakely v.The DevereuxFound.,Inc.,No.6:10-cv-1808-ORL-35-KRS (M.D.Fla.Aug.16,
2011)(noting the settlement of the case);Order of Dismissal with Prejudice,Blakely v.
The DevereuxFound.,Inc.,No.6:10-cv-1808-ORL-35-KRS (M.D.Fla.Sept.13,2011)(dis-
missing the case with prejudice).
89.See, e.g.,Lauren Odes, Former Native Intimates Employee, Claims She Was Fired
over Too Hot Appearance, HUFFINGTON POST (May 22,2012,8:57AM)[hereinafter Lauren
Odes Too Hot Appearance],http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/22/lauren-odes-native
-intimates-fired_n_1535498.html [http://perma.cc/YST3-7YKH];Chris Francescani,Fired
for Being Too Hot, New Jersey Woman Claims (May 21,2012,7:06 PM),http://www
.reuters.com/article/2012/05/21/us-newyork-lingerie-hot-idUSBRE84K18220120521
[http://perma.cc/8VWX-YGBM].
90.Lauren Odes Too Hot Appearance,supra note 89(internal quotations omitted).
91.Francescani,supra note 89.
92.See, e.g.,Marisa Meltzer,Youre Cute and Fired, N.Y.TIMES (Nov.29,2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/01/fashion/Some-women-are-fired-for-being-too-attrac
tive.html?_r=o [http://perma.cc/Y9ZL-F9A8].Adding an additional twist to this tale,the
wife was herself a former Playboy Playmate.See Lorena Mongelli & Bruce Golding,
Fired for Being Too Cute by Ex-Playmate Boss, N.Y.POST (Nov.20,2013,10:51PM),
http://nypost.com/2013/11/20/fired-for-being-too-cute-by-ex-playmate-boss.html [http://
perma.cc/28EB-BZJD].
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What is interesting about all of these claims is the double-edged
sword that they illustrate: in many cases, these female plaintiffs
like other women in the workplace may garner a wealth of benefits
from their attractive physical appearance,in terms of hiring,promo-
tion,compensation,and other feedback.93 Yet their attractiveness
can also create problems for them at work, placing them between
a rock and a hard place. Insulted and not hired if they arent attrac-
tive, fired if they are too attractive.94Compounding the problem,once
these women are faced with this alleged unfairness at work pur-
portedly receiving adverse treatment due to their appearance they
may receive less sympathy from their peers and from the general
public due to their physical beauty.95 Observers may or may not be
moved by a claim that can be restated as Dont hate me because Im
beautiful.96 In this respect,attractive employees may see the
negative consequences of their physical appearance as eventually
outweighing the benefits produced by their appearance.
II.ANOTHER PATH?HOW NELSON AND OTHER ATTRACTIVE
EMPLOYEESMIGHT PREVAIL IN SIMILAR CASES
Cases like Nelson thus present quite a puzzle:although count-
less studies establish that attractive employees enjoy significant
advantages at work,97 Nelson and her counterparts claim that their
attractive looks undermined their jobs. Although Nelsons straight-
forward theory of sex discrimination that she did not do anything
to get herself fired except exist as a female98 did not lead to victory,
there are other paths that she,and others like her,might success-
fully pursue if they believe that they were fired as a result of their
good looks.
A. The Missing Harassment Claim as One Possible Route to
Future Success
One obvious route that was available to Ms. Nelson yet one that
she elected not to pursue was a sexual harassment claim against
93.See supra note 71.
94.Pepper Schwartz,Fired Because a Man Cant Control Himself, CNN (July 16,
2013,7:57AM),http:/www.cnn.com/2013/07/16/opinion/schwartz-fired-looks [http:/perma
.cc/5V4C-YVRB].
95.See, e.g.,Corbett,supra note 11, at 632 (If Lorenzana were an unattractive per-
son suing for unfair termination,she likely would evoke sympathy,but,ironically,not
nearly as much publicity.However,with an attractive woman,this story may have the
opposite effect.).
96.See, e.g.,Corbett,supra note 11,at 632.
97.See, e.g.,Toledano,supra note 11, at 68384; Kimmel, supra note 11.
98.Nelson v.Knight,834N.W.2d 64,69(Iowa 2013)(internal quotations omitted).
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Knight. Knights behavior seemed to provide ample ammunition for
a viable sexual harassment claim.99As discussed above,he engaged
in explicit,seemingly one-sided sexual banter with Nelson,made
suggestive comments regarding her clothing and her sexlife,and
described to Nelson,in graphic terms,the extent to which she made
him feel sexually aroused.100 Despite this evidence, Nelsons counsel
chose not to pursue a harassment theory,and stuckonly to a theory
of sexdiscrimination.101 This failure to allege harassment allowed
the Iowa Supreme Court repeatedly to characterize the relationship
between Knight and Nelson as consensual in nature,102and led the
court specifically to observe that the lack of a harassment claim
limited its decision in this case.103 From this perspective, Nelsons
loss may appear more as an example of a missed opportunity by her
attorney than as a misinterpretation of the law by the court.
To prevail in a sexual harassment claim,a plaintiff generally
must show that she either was subjected to unwelcome sexual ha-
rassment that was sufficiently severe and pervasive to alter the terms
and conditions of employment, or that she suffered some tangible
employment action (i.e., a termination, demotion, etc.) as a result
of her failure to submit to a [superiors] sexual demands . . . .104
Here, much of Knights undisputed conduct seems to provide an
ample basis for both types of sexual harassment:Nelson either
could argue that Knights sexually explicit texts and comments cre-
ated a hostile workenvironment,or she could claim that,regardless
of whatever atmosphere his comments created,her termination re-
sulted from her rebuff of his overtures.105Yet Nelson never alleged,in
either her formal court filings or any press statements, that Knights
conduct constituted sexual harassment.106
So why did Nelson refrain from bringing this claim?As the court
repeatedly noted, Nelson never objected to Knights overtures, and
apparently viewed her close and personal relationship with Knight
as consensual in nature.107 Nelsons own attorney stated that Nelson
99.Id. at 6566 (describing Knights overtures to Nelson).
100.Id. (describing Knights sexually graphic communications with Nelson); see also
id. at 72 n.7 (Dr. Knight made a number of inappropriate comments toward Nelson that
are of a type often seen in sexual harassment cases.).
101.See, e.g.,id. at 65,72n.7.
102.See, e.g.,id. at 8081 (Cady, J., concurring) (referencing the consensual nature
of the relationship between Knight and Nelson).
103.Id. at 65.
104.See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 75254 (1998).
105.See id.; see also Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 6566 (describing Knights communi-
cations with Nelson).
106.See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65, 72 n.7 (referencing Nelsons failure to assert a sexual
harassment claim).
107.See id. at 6566; see also id. at 7879 (Cady, J., concurring).
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declined to bring a harassment claim because Knights conduct may
not have risen to that level and didnt particularly offend [Nelson].108
Although Nelson felt shocked and betrayed by Knights conduct,
she chalked these exchanges up to social[] awkward[ness] on his
part as opposed to harassment.109Moreover,whereas Knight adopted
the role of the initiator of these sex-fueled communications,with
Nelson maintaining a more passive role  receiving his graphic over-
tures but apparently never responding with any sexual comments of
her own110 she never took any steps to terminate these communica-
tions (including the most obvious one,asking Knight to stop).111
Of course, even Nelsons consent to these conversations or,
at a minimum, her failure explicitly to object should not necessar-
ily have stymied a harassment claim.Where,as here,there is a sig-
nificant power differential between the parties in a relationship,
courts may be skeptical of the consensual nature of that relation-
ship.112At least one court has recognized that a plaintiff reasonably
108.Press-Citizen Editorial Board,supra note 66;see also Agence France Presse,Irre-
sistible Iowa Woman Fired for Being Too Sexy, BUS.INSIDER (Dec.25,2012,6:11AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/melissa-nelson-f ired-for-being-too-sexy-2012-12
[http://perma.cc/54CN-JYBQ] (Nelson did not consider Knights behavior to be sexual
harassment . . . .); Jeff Eckhoff, Top Iowa Courts Do-Over: Irresistible Employee Fired
Legally for Personal Reasons, DES MOINES REGISTER,July 13,2013,2013 WLNR
17075810 (noting the courts emphasis that Nelsons lawsuit stressed improper behavior
by Knight but alleged sexual discrimination and not harassment); Mary Sanchez,
Another View: Iowa Court Shows that Equality Between the Sexes Really Isnt, DES
MOINES REGISTER, Jan. 2, 2013, 2013 WLNR 93954 (stating that Nelsons case did not
meet guidelines for a hostile work environment or abusive atmosphere).
109.Interview with Paige Fiedler,Attorney for Melissa Nelson (June 2,2014)(notes
on file with author). Knights attorney has echoed this view,stating that Nelson admitted
during a deposition that she never felt harassed,never was offended,and that she re-
spected Knight.Interview with Stuart Cochrane,Attorney for James H.Knight (May 29,
2014)(notes on file with author). Indeed, according to Nelsons attorney,Nelson did not
allege sexual harassment because in her view Knights conduct may not have risen to
that level and didnt particularly offend [Nelson]. Press-Citizen Editorial Board, supra
note 66;see also Interview with Paige Fiedler,Attorney for Melissa Nelson (June 2,
2014)(notes on file with author)(confirming that Nelson felt shocked and betrayed by
Knights conduct but did not view it as harassment).
110.Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 6566.
111.Id. at 66 (Nelson does not remember ever telling Dr. Knight not to text her or
telling him that she was offended.); see also id. at 6566 (noting that Nelson once texted
Knight, [t]he only reason I stay is because of you (internal quotations omitted)).
112.See, e.g., Simmons v. Miami Valley Trotting, Inc., 2006 WL 1000076, *56 (S.D.
Ohio 2006) (finding that plaintiffs failure to confront her manager regarding the
unwelcome sexual conduct was plausible in light of the disparity of power between a
lower-level maintenance employee and the owner of the business); Hernandez v.
Miranda Velez, 1994 WL 394855, *3 (D.P.R. 1994) ([A]buse of power in the supervisory-
underling relationship is the essence of the classic definition of sexual harassment in
any setting . . . .); see also Billie Wright Dziech et al.,Consensual or Submissive
Relationships: The Second-Best Kept Secret, 6DUKE J.GENDER L.& POLY 83,85(1999)
([C]onsent cannot exist in conjunction with unequal distribution of authority ...power
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may refrain from telling a supervisor that sexual comments are un-
welcome if he or she fears that objecting might cost the plaintiff his
or her job, citing the disparity of power between a lower-level . . . em-
ployee and the owner of the business.113 Indeed,in rendering his
concurring opinion in Nelson,the Chief Justice acknowledged that a
personal relationship between an employer and subordinate can
give rise to subtle issues of power and control that may make the line
between consensual and submissive relationships difficult to draw.114
In this case, however, the Chief Justice noted that Nelson made no
legal or factual claim that a relationship with Dr.Knight was sub-
missive,objectionable,or harassing in any way,and there was no evi-
dence in the record to hint the relationship was not jointly pursued.115
Whereas Nelson elected not to pursue a sexual harassment
claim in this case,116other plaintiffs alleging adverse treatment due
to their attractive physical appearance perhaps would have a basis
for asserting this theory as part of a wrongful termination claim.As
the Nelson court observed,the consensual nature of Knight and
Nelsons sexually charged (but unconsummated) relationship was
rather unusual.117 In many cases,the comments directed toward a
plaintiff who claims to have been too attractive for a workplace
likely will involve the sort of graphic or sexually charged language
and status disparities place subordinates in untenable positions from which some lack
the fortitude and support to extricate themselves . . . .). But see, e.g.,Olsen v.Marshall
Ilsley Corp.,2000WL 34233699,*1,*17(W.D.Wis.2000)(disputing the notion that a
relationship between a subordinate and a supervisor establishes conclusive evidence of
sexual harassment and emphasizing the need to show unwilling consent to establish
harassment claim (internal quotations omitted)).
113.Simmons, 2006WL 1000076at *2.
114.Nelson,834N.W.2d at 80(Cady,J.,concurring).
115.Id.;see also id. at 6566 (majority opinion), 7980 (Cady,J.,concurring)(referenc-
ing the consensual nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson).Notably,despite
the wealth of evidence indicating the consensual nature of the relationship between Knight
and Nelson,Nelson did endeavor to distinguish her situation from those in other cases
involving consensual workplace relationships between (terminated)employees and their
bosses.Id. at 6768. In at least one other case cited by the court,the terminated plaintiff
had played an active role in creating the jealousy-inducing relationship (for example,by
pinching her bosss rear and by writing notes of a sexual nature to the owner and leaving
them in locations where others could find them).Id. (discussing plaintiffs actions in Tenge
v.Phillips Modern Ag Co.,446 F.3d 903, 90506 (8th Cir. 2006)). Nelson, in contrast,
argued that she never flirted with Knight or encouraged his overtures, arguing that she
did not do anything to get herself fired except exist as a female. Id. at 65,69.
116.See, e.g.,id. at 65.
117.Id. at 78 (Cady,J.,concurring).At least one local editorial regarding this case
commented on the strangeness of Nelsons failure to bring a sexual harassment claim
based upon this set of facts, with the authors stating that they [couldnt] understand why
Nelson filed suit based on gender discrimination rather than sexual harassment ....
[S]he could have made a stronger case for Knight having created a hostile workenviron-
ment. Press-Citizen Editorial Board, supra note 66.
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that can support a claim of sexual harassment.118 Moreover,most
employees receiving such sexually graphic communications from an
employer likely would object to such comments either explicitly at
the time they are made or,at least,by later arguing that a subordi-
nate position in the workplace prevented him or her from raising such
contemporaneous objections.119 Thus,even if other plaintiffs simi-
larly situated to Nelson might not prevail in alleging sexdiscrimina-
tion based upon an employer firing them due to their (attractive)
physical appearance,they most likely would have a strong basis for
characterizing their termination and/or any other adverse action as
an example of unlawful sexual harassment.
B. The Attractive Employee as a Victim of Gender Stereotyping:
Applying Price Waterhouse to the Too Hot Employee
Whereas some plaintiffs similarly situated to Nelson might find
success simply by adding an allegation of sexual harassment to their
complaints,others may wish to pursue sex discrimination claims
separate from any allegations of harassment.Success also might be
possible for this group of plaintiffs,under an interpretation of anti-
discrimination law that deals with sex stereotyping at work.
Until the late 1980s, the courts interpreted sex discrimination,
under Title VII,120 in a fairly straightforward manner by construing
the term sex in Title VII to apply only to anatomical sex, and not to
gender (i.e.,whether someone demonstrates qualities that society
deems masculine or feminine).121In 1989,however,the U.S.Supreme
Court issued its landmarkdecision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
finding for the very first time that sexstereotyping in the workplace
was a prohibited form of sexdiscrimination.122
118.See, e.g.,Mandell,supra note 83(discussing sexually graphic comments made to
former nonprofit executive Amy-Erin Blakely).
119.See, e.g.,Simmons,2006WL 1000076at *5(finding that plaintiff did not tell her su-
pervisor that his comments were unwelcome because she feared losing her job);Hernandez
v.Miranda Velez,1994WL 394855,*1(D.P.R.1994)(alleging that she told her supervisor
about unwelcome conduct but no action was taken);Nelson,834N.W.2d at 80(Cady,J.,
concurring)(noting issues of power and control that arise in such situations);cf.Dziech
et al.,supra note 112,at 85(explaining that consent cannot exist with the unequal dis-
tribution of authority in a superior/subordinate relationship).
120.Title VII bars employers from depriving individuals of employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely impacting an individuals employment because of that individuals
sex,among other protected characteristics.42U.S.C.§2000e-2(a)(1964).
121.See Taylor Flynn,Transforming the Debate: Why We Need to Include Transgender
Rights in the Struggles for Sex and Sexual Orientation Equality, 101COLUM.L.REV.392,
39496 (2001).
122.490 U.S. 228, 25051 (1989), superseded by statute,Civil Rights Act of 1991,Pub.
L.No.102-166,105Stat.1075(codified at 42U.S.C.§2000e-2(m)).
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The circumstances under which Price Waterhouse arose present
an interesting contrast to Nelson. Ann Hopkins was serving as a
Senior Manager in an office of the accounting firm Price Waterhouse
when she was proposed for partnership in 1982.123 During the firms
consideration of her partnership, Hopkinss colleagues praised her
character and her many professional accomplishments,124 although
they simultaneously criticized some of her personality traits.125 For
example, some partners expressed concern about Hopkinss aggres-
siveness and abrasiveness when dealing with staff.126 One part-
ner described [Hopkins] as macho, . . . [and] another suggested that
she overcompensated for being a woman.127Hopkins was told that
she should take a course at charm school,128and she was advised
to walk more femininely, talk more femininely,dress more femi-
ninely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.129
Hopkins was ultimately denied partnership,130 and thereafter sued
for sexdiscrimination under Title VII.131
In finding Price Waterhouse liable for violating Title VII in this
case,the Supreme Court emphasized that,although employers retain
broad latitude in making their employment decisions,such decisions
cannot be made on the basis of gender.132 In cases where gender
seems to play some role in a decision perhaps in conjunction with
other characteristics, unrelated to gender an employer must be able
to show that gender was not a motivating factor (i.e.,that it would
have made the same decision anyway,even if it had not taken gender
into account).133 More importantly,the Court held that employers
who make employment decisions on the basisof sex-based stereotypes
are inherently engaging in sexdiscrimination.134 The Court stated,
123.Id. at 231.
124.Id. at 234.
125.Id. at 23435.
126.Id. at 234.
127.Id. at 235.
128.Price Waterhouse,490U.S. at 235.
129.Id. (quoting Hopkins v.Price Waterhouse,618F.Supp.1109(D.D.C.1985),affd in
part, revd in part,Hopkins v.Price Waterhouse,825F.2d 458(D.C.Cir.1987),revd,Price
Waterhouse v.Hopkins,490U.S.228(1989)(internal quotations omitted)).
130.Id. at 23132 (noting that Hopkins initially was neither offered nor denied part-
nership,but rather had her candidacy held for reconsideration the following year,and that
partners in her office later refused to repropose her for partnership).
131.Id. at 232.
132.Id. at 23940.
133.Id. at 24445. We conclude that the preservation of [the employers] freedom
means that an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that,even if it had not taken gen-
der into account,it would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person.
Id. at 242.
134.Price Waterhouse,490U.S.at 251;cf. Allegra C.Wiles,More Than Just a Pretty
Face: Preventing the Perpetuation of Sexual Stereotypes in the Workplace, 57SYRACUSE
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[W]e are beyond the day when an employer could evaluate employees
by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated
with their group,135 and noted that an employer who acts on the
basis of a belief that a woman cannot be aggressive,or that she must
not be, has acted on the basis of gender.136In other words,by basing
its decisions regarding Hopkinss potential partnership on assump-
tions about how a woman should behave at work and by denying
Hopkins partnership for not complying with these assumptions
Price Waterhouse had engaged in gender discrimination.137
This theory of sex stereotyping gender discrimination has direct
application to cases like Nelson and could provide a possible route
to success for other plaintiffs who claim to have received adverse
treatment due to their attractive appearance.138 Just as Hopkins
claimed to have suffered adverse treatment for not matching her
colleagues expectations of a woman,139 Nelson could have argued
that she suffered from a similar failure to meet expectations as to
how a female should lookand behave,in that she claimed that she
was too sexy and feminine for her workplace at least according to
her employer.140 From the way that she dressed to her willingness
to tolerate (or perhaps engage in)sexual discussions with Knight,
Nelson could argue that she fell outside of the expected norm for a
woman at work.141
Tellingly,even the Iowa Supreme Court seemed to recognize
the potential for this type of claim in Nelson:the court explicitly dis-
cussed the gender stereotyping framework established by Price
Waterhouse and stated, [i]f Nelson could show that she had been
terminated because she did not conform to a particular stereotype,
this might be a different case.142 Whereas Nelson failed to provide
evidence to support this theory,143others who claim to have suffered
adverse action due to their attractive physical appearance might be
L.REV.657, 660 (2007) ([S]ex stereotyping involves generalizing from the characteristics
of a group to those of an individual and making assumptions,which may or may not be
true, about an individual because of that persons gender.).
135.Price Waterhouse, 490U.S.at 251.
136.Id. at 250.
137.See id. at 25658.
138.Others have discussed using a gender stereotyping theory of gender discrimina-
tion to address appearance discrimination. See, e.g.,Corbett,supra note 11, at 63537;
Wiles,supra note 134,at 660.
139.Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 23637 (citing the district court judges view that
some of the partners remarks about Hopkins stemmed from an impermissibly cabined
view of the proper behavior of women).
140.See Nelson v.Knight, 834 N.W.2d 64, 6566.
141.See id.
142.Id. at 71.
143.See id.
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able to gather sufficient evidence to show that by violating gender
norms regarding how female employees should dress and act at work,
they ventured outside of the cabined view of the proper behavior
[for] women that their employers imposed in the workplace.144
Moreover,even under the theory that Nelson was terminated
not for her appearance,but rather due to the jealousy-inducing rela-
tionship that she had with her boss,145 Nelson still arguably could
have supported a stereotyping theory of gender discrimination.Per-
haps the norm that Nelson failed to satisfy was not simply a fail-
ure to dress in the manner in which the Knights believed a working
woman should dress or to appear in the manner in which the Knights
believed a working woman should appear.Rather,perhaps the norm
at issue involved Nelsons behaviorher failure to behave in the
manner in which Mrs.Knight thought a working woman should be-
have.To the extent that one might not expect a married woman to
form a close,personal relationship with a male coworker or boss,146
the jealousy-inducing relationship that formed the basis for Nelsons
termination could be seen as its own violation of gender expecta-
tions.Although the court largely ignored this theory in its opinion,
there is at least some evidence to support this analysis:the court
noted that Mrs. Knight had deemed it strange that after being at
workall day and away from her kids and husbandthat [Nelson]would
not be anxious to get home like the other [women]in the office.147 Al-
though the court acknowledged that [v]iewed in isolation, this state-
ment could be an example of a gender-based stereotype,148 it gave
this argument only cursory attention and quickly concluded that,in
the broader context of other statements made by Mrs.Knight,this
144.Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S.at 237;cf. Kimmel,supra note 11 (Discrimination
based on beauty is rooted in the same sexist principle as discrimination against the ugly.
Both rest on the power of the male gaze the fact that mens estimation of beauty is the
defining feature of the category.).
145.Nelson,834N.W.2d at 66.
146.See, e.g.,Kristi Gustafson Barlette,Can Men and Women Be Friends (At Work)?,
TIMES UNION (Sept.4,2012,11:57AM),http://blog.timesunion.com/ontheedge/can-men
-and-women-be-friends-at-work/50781 [http://perma.cc/TT6U-NJ7X];Bethany Ramos,
Your Work Husband Is Ruining Your Marriage,MOMMYISH.COM (Mar.17,2014),http:/
www.mommyish.com/2014/03/17/work-husband [http://perma.cc/D68B-E22P]; Leslie
Rasmussen,Can Married Women Have Straight Male Friends?, ROLE REBOOT (Jan.24,
2013),http:/www.rolereboot.org/sex-and-relationships/details/2013-01-can-married-women
-have-single-male-friends[http:/perma.cc/P8NU-E7ZD];cf.JanaKasperkevic,Why Women
Cant Have Business Dinners with Men, THE GUARDIAN (Dec.18,2013,8:00AM),http://
www.theguardian.com/money/us-money-blog/2013/dec/18/women-business-dinners-men
[http://perma.cc/3LJT-52WX].
147.Nelson, 834N.W.2d at 66(emphasis added);id. at 71n.5.
148.Id. at 71n.5.
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statement instead simply evidenced Mrs. Knights (non-stereotype-
based) concerns about Nelsons relationship with Knight.149
Whereas Nelson did not succeed in providingsupport for this type
of gender stereotyping sexdiscrimination claim,other plaintiffs alleg-
ing adverse treatment due to their attractive physical appearance
might have more success with this theory.Indeed,even a cursory ex-
amination of the facts in other situations where employees have
alleged adverse treatment due to their beauty indicates that this
theory could play out differently in other cases:in the Willingham
case, for example where the plaintiff was terminated after she ap-
peared as Ms. Cruzin South August 2008, as well as in sexually
suggestive photos in another publication150 Willingham specifically
alleged that her physical appearance in a non-work related maga-
zine did not comport with [the employers] preferred feminine stereo-
type which . . . required her to dress or appear conservatively at all
times.151 The court,however,rejected this argument,finding that
the out-of-worknature of the conduct rendered a Price Waterhouse
argument inapplicable here.152 Concerns about gender stereotypes,
likewise,could be seen underlying the claims ofDebrahlee Lorenzana,
the Citibank banker who claimed to have been fired because her
figure and clothes were too distracting to her male colleagues.153Pre-
sumably, had Lorenzana fit the mold of the typical banker conserva-
tively and expensively but modestly attired154 her male colleagues
would not have noticed and/or been distracted by her appearance.155
149.See id.;see also id. at 77 n.11 (Cady, J., concurring) (As to the discriminatory
stereotype that attractive women who workclosely with married men are a threat to the
mans marriage . . . a threat derived from an actual,ongoing,personal relationship is not
a stereotype.).
150.Willingham v. Regions Bank, 2010 WL 2650727, *12 (W.D. Tenn. 2010).
151.Id. at *3(emphasis added)(ellipses in original)(internal quotations omitted).
152.See id. at *3 (stating that Willinghams sex stereotyping claim fails because
[she]has failed to allege that [she]did not conform to traditional gender stereotypes in
any observable way at work) (emphasis and parentheticals in original)(internal quota-
tions omitted).
153.Pilkington,supra note 72.
154.See Stereotypes of Traders and Bankers, WALL STREET OASIS (June 2,2011,
7:24 PM), http://www.wallstreetoasis.com/forums/stereotypes-of-traders-and-bankers
[http://perma.cc/GSS3-3W6U](citing Yale finance professor Robert Shillers observation
that investment bankers tend to be well dressed;they tend to be patrician in their appear-
ances and manner).
155.In some circumstances,other types of stereotypes beyond those associated with
gender (such as religious stereotypes)also arguably might play a role in adverse action.
See, e.g.,Francescani,supra note 89(quoting a female data entry employee fired from
her position at a lingerie warehouse owned by Orthodox Jews as stating, I understand
that there are Orthodox Jewish men who may have their views about how a woman
should dress . . . but I do not feel that any employer has the right to impose their reli-
gious beliefs on me) (emphasis added).
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Notably,to bring this type of sexstereotyping claim,a plaintiff
need not demonstrate that the defendant harbored hostility toward
the protected group.156In other words,neither Nelson nor any other
plaintiff would have to show that their employer demonstrated ill will
toward women in general.157 Rather,these employees only would
have to show that men and women were intentionally treated dif-
ferently in the workplace, even if the stereotypes underlying this
treatment were benign.158
At the same time,however,these cases involving gender stereo-
typing expose the double bind that many women face in the work-
place.159 They must be feminine enough to satisfy their employers
expectations regarding how a woman should appear and behave at
work,160but not so overtly sexual and overly feminine so as to distract
their fellow employees.161For Hopkins,this created an obvious catch
twenty-two:she needed to be aggressive and forceful to excel in her
job,but she was denied the pinnacle of recognition for workplace suc-
cess (i.e.,partnership)precisely because she exhibited these traits.162
Admittedly,for other female employees,this argument plays
out somewhat differently than it would have in Hopkins.Unlike
Hopkins who was required to be assertive in order to make part-
ner, then penalized for meeting this expectation the female plain-
tiffs in cases like Nelson, Willingham, or Lorenzana are not being
asked to mute characteristics that are essential to performing or
excelling in their job duties.163 These women did not hold positions
(dental assistant,bankers)in which the attribute for which they pur-
portedly were penalized their physical attractiveness enhanced
156.See Wiles,supra note 134,at 670.
157.In this respect, the courts observations that Knight employed many women in
his practice,and that all of his dental hygienists (including the one who ultimately replaced
Nelson)had been women,might have limited relevance.Nelson v.Knight,834N.W.2d
64,66(Iowa 2013).Although Knight may have harbored positive feelings toward women
in general,this would not excuse his decision to take action against Nelson based on a ste-
reotype regarding how females should behave in the workplace.
158.See Wiles,supra note 134,at 670.
159.Kimberly A.Yuracko,Soul of a Woman: The Sex Stereotyping Prohibitions at Work,
161U.PA.L.REV.757,762(2013).
160.See id.;see also Price Waterhouse v.Hopkins, 490 U.S.228,at 251.But see
Jespersen v. Harrahs Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 110506 (2006) (affirming summary
judgment for the employer where the employee alleged gender discrimination after ter-
mination from a bartender position for refusing to wear cosmetics and style her hair in
accordance with employers dress code).
161.See Yuracko,supra note 159,at 762;see also Price Waterhouse, 490U.S.at 251
(describing the dilemma that exists when an employer objects to aggressiveness,but the
position requires that specific trait).
162.See Price Waterhouse,490U.S.at 251;Yuracko,supra note 159,at 762.
163.Yuracko,supra note 159,at 762; Nelson v.Knight,834N.W.2d 64,65(Iowa 2013);
Willingham v.Regions Bank,2010WL 2650727,*3(W.D.Tenn.2010);Lorenzana Com-
plaint at 2,Lorenzana v.Citigroup Inc.,No.11Civ.6153(JFK)(S.D.N.Y.2012).
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their performance in any obvious way.Yet despite this distinction,
even plaintiffs in these too hot cases may be able to draw upon the
underlying tenets of Price Waterhouse to argue that they suffered
gender discrimination due to the application of sexstereotypes.164
III.THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN MISREPRESENTING THESE CASES:
THE QUEST TO MAINTAIN THE MADONNA-WHOREPARADIGM
Despite the possible routes to success that may have existed for
Nelson from her neglected sexual harassment claim to a possible
gender stereotyping claim Nelson ultimately failed to prevail in
her claim against Knight.165Given the salacious facts in this case,166
some amount of media attention and, perhaps, some critiquing of
the result was to be expected. In the wake of the Iowa Supreme
Courts decision in Nelson,however,the media unleashed an on-
slaught of condemnation toward this decision, eviscerating the courts
conclusion in this case.From small,local outlets to national news
organizations,the media almost uniformly described this case in
simple (and often inaccurate) terms as one involving a woman who
had been fired solely based upon her appearance,and involving an
all-male court with no concept of womens rights, without address-
ing the complicated relational circumstances that underlay this case
or the precedent that actually controlled the courts decision.
A. Snapshot of a Hyperbolic Media
The reporting in the wake of the Nelson decision following
both the initial,December 2012decision and the subsequent July
2013 decision abounded with examples of the media presenting
this decision in simplistic,hyperbolic,and often flatly incorrect
terms: shortly following the courts initial decision in this case,
Business Insider headlined its coverage, Irresistible Iowa Woman
Fired for Being Too Sexy,167 and reported that [a]n irresistible
Iowa dental assistant [who was] fired for threatening her bosss
marriage even though she turned away his advances has lost her
discrimination lawsuit.168
164.See Price Waterhouse,490U.S.at 251.
165.See Nelson, 834N.W.2d at 65.
166.See id. at 6566.
167.Agence France Presse,supra note 108.
168.Id. This conclusion was reached even though nothing in the record indicates that
Nelson ever rejected Knights advances and even though Nelsons failure to bring a ha-
rassment claim seems to contradict such a characterization of her stance toward her boss.
See Nelson,834N.W.2d at 65,72n.7.
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A CNN story following the courts second decision described this
case as one in which a woman was [f]ired because a man cant control
himself.169 The story blasted the all-male Iowa Supreme Court for
allegedly holding that men are so controlled by their gonads that
they can fire an employee at will for being able to incite attraction,
sex, love, whatever,170 and for finding that [n]o matter that she is
going about her job or being a stellar employee; if shes got a cute butt
or a nicely turned nose, her job is history.171 According to the CNN
commentator, the Iowa Supreme Court guys . . . saw the issue, at
least in part,as protecting the institution of marriage rather than
an infringement on a womans right to work.172 Nowhere did this
story mention that the Iowa Supreme Court was relying upon Eighth
Circuit precedent, which previously had held that an employer does
not engage in [sex]discrimination by discharging a female employee
who is involved in a consensual [personal]relationship that has
triggered personal jealousy.173 Nowhere did the story mention the
extent to which the Iowa courts decision rested on the consensual
nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson.174 Nowhere
did this reporter explain the limited nature of the courts decision the
fact that the court repeatedly had noted Nelsons failure to bring a
sexual harassment claim or otherwise to characterize Knights con-
duct as unwelcome.175
Additionally,there was the New York Times editorial that seemed
to set the bar for sensationalizing the Iowa Supreme Courts deci-
sion:in a piece entitled Fired for Being Beautiful, the writer joined
the media chorus in slamming the courts holding.176 The author
compared the Iowa Justices to Islamic fundamentalists,observing,
[y]es, like some Midwestern Taliban tribunal, the Iowa Supreme
Court permitted a male boss to fire anyone who might conceivably
tempt him. Mullah Omar would approve.177 The writer went on to
suggest that [m]aybe . . . the Iowa Supreme Court should require
all beautiful women to wear burquas and opined that [w]ith Ms.
Nelson completely covered,Mr.Knight could pay full attention to
his patients dental concerns while ignoring the ethical cavity that
169.Schwartz,supra note 94.
170.Id.
171.Id.
172.Id.
173.Nelson,834N.W.2d at 67.
174.See id. at 6566 (referencing the consensual nature of Knight and Nelsons rela-
tionship).
175.See id. at 72n.7.
176.See Kimmel,supra note 11.
177.Id.
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mars discrimination law in Iowa.178 Once again,nowhere in the
article did the author mention the unusual factual circumstances
under which this case arose. Nowhere in his evisceration of
Knight with his willpower so limp, his commitment to his wife so
weak, that he must be shielded from the hot and the beautiful179
did the writer note the apparently consensual nature of the relation-
ship between Knight and Nelson or the significant role that this
relationship played in the courts decision.180
Local outlets likewise played a role in simplifying and hyper-
bolizing the results in this case,particularly in editorials and other
opinion pieces: in the wake of the Iowa Supreme Courts initial deci-
sion, one local editorial identified Knights attraction to Nelson and
fear that he might act unprofessionally toward her as the lone reason
for Nelsons termination.181 Although the editorial mentioned prior
precedent that upheld an employers right to fire for relationships
that cause jealousy and tension within a business owners family,182
the editorial again failed to note the limited nature of the courts
decision,with its emphasis on the consensual nature of the relation-
ship between Knight and Nelson.183 Another editorial more explic-
itly argued both sides of the issue:although the piece acknowledged
that finding in Nelsons favor would force[] an employer in [Knights]
situation to keep an employee whose continued employment could
lead to a sexual-harassment lawsuit, a divorce or both,184 its head-
line trumpeted that Iowa law allows men to be jerks.185 Yet another
editorial instructed its readers, [t]hats right, ladies. If the boss
finds you too hot, you can be fired,186 neglecting to inform readers
of the full, nuanced scope of the courts decision that if your boss
finds you too hot, and you engage in a consensual relationship
with him that causes jealousy,and you fail ever to allege that his
comments about your hotness were unwelcome or harassing, then
you can be fired.187 This local criticism continued in the wake of the
courts second opinion in this case: a piece tellingly titled in part
Court Backs the Lusty Boss Over the Innocent Employee described
178.Id.
179.Id.
180.Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 6768 (comparing Nelsons case to other Eighth Circuit
cases involving consensual relationship[s] that . . . triggered personal jealousy).
181.Press-Citizen Editorial Board,supra note 66(emphasis added).
182.Id.
183.Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 6566.
184.The Register Editorial: Unfortunately, Iowa Law Allows Men to Be Jerks, DES
MOINES REGISTER,Dec.28,2012,2012WLNR 28051945.
185.Id.
186.Sanchez,supra note 108.
187.Nelson,834F.2d at 65,67,73.
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this case in similarly simplistic terms,electing simply to blast the
courts adolescent rationale and idiotic conclusion instead of
explaining the nuances of the decision to its readers.188
To be sure,in all of these articles,there was a sizable kernel of
truth in the medias reporting: to the extent that the stories por-
trayed the Nelson case as one where an employer was permitted to
terminate an employee because her physical attractiveness led to a
consensual relationship between them and such relationship ren-
dered her a threat to the employers marriage (at least, in the em-
ployers wifes view),189 these reporters correctly portrayed at least
part of the story.Virtually none of the stories reporting this decision
provided the proper context for the case explaining the Iowa
precedent that exempts from discrimination liability terminations
resulting from consensual personal relationships that cause jeal-
ousy,190 or noting the extent to which the outcome here rested upon
a very narrow set of facts,in which the terminated employee specifi-
cally declined to allege that her employers conduct and comments
were unwelcome or harassing.191 Whereas it may have made for
better news to portray the justices of the Iowa Supreme Court as a
rogue group of misogynistic bigots,a more accurate report regarding
this case would have included these less sensationalistic,but legally
significant,facts.
Interestingly,even the Iowa Supreme Court itself may have
sensed the potential for the media and the public to misunderstand
the nature of the Nelson case:as noted above,the Iowa Supreme
188.What Others Are Saying: Court Backs the Lusty Boss Over the Innocent Employee,
DES MOINES REGISTER,July 18,2013,2013WLNR 17496269.Notably,at least one Iowa
paper reported this decision in what appeared to be a fair,accurate and non-sensationalized
manner (despite a headline foreshadowing to the contrary).In Top Iowa Courts Do-Over:
Irresistible Employee Fired Legally for Personal Reasons, Jeff Eckhoff of the Des Moines
Register accurately noted that in the Iowa Supreme Courts first decision in this case,
it had cit[ed] prior legal precedent to rule that Knights conduct was legal because it
was based on specific emotions tied to a specific relationship and not based on his
attitude toward an entire gender. Eckhoff, supra note 108. Describing the courts follow-
up decision on reconsideration,the article reported that Nelson was terminated because
of the activities of her consensual personal relationship with her employer,not because
of her gender. Eckhoff, supra note 108(quoting Nelson v.Knight,834N.W.2d 64,78(Iowa
2013)(Cady,J.,concurring)(internal quotations omitted). Eckhoff cited the Justices view
that Nelson was fired because of her behavior, not her gender. Eckhoff, supra note 108.
To be sure,the greater depth of analysis,thoroughness,and balanced nature of this arti-
cle as compared to others cited herein might be due to the fact that it was a news article,
and not an editorial or opinion piece.Nonetheless,the contrast between this article and
others appearing in reputable media outlets is notable.
189.Nelson,834N.W.2d at 66.
190.Id. at 6768.
191.Id. at 65.
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Court issued two decisions in this case first issuing a unanimous
opinion granting summary judgment to Knight on December 21,
2012,192 and later substituting a second opinion in July 2013(doing
so without having any new evidence presented to the court or any
additional oral argument).193Although this second opinion again af-
firmed summary judgment for Knight,194 it differed from the courts
initial opinion in some significant respects:first,though all of the
Justices had signed onto the courts December 2012 opinion,195 the
July 2013opinion included a lengthy concurrence authored by the
Chief Justice of the court.196 This concurring opinion contained a
more extensive explanation of the basis and rationale for the
courts decision than that which had been issued previously.197Among
other points,the Chief Justice emphasized that Nelson had stated
a claim for sexdiscrimination (or,perhaps,several possible claims
for sexdiscrimination)under Iowa law,198 arguing that she simply
had failed to articulate sufficient facts to support her claim,199 par-
ticularly in light of the consensual nature of her relationship with
Dr.Knight.200 Withdrawing a unanimous opinion only to substitute
another that reaches the same result (only with somewhat more ex-
tensive analysis),is not a common action for an already overburdened
court.Indeed,issuing such an opinion without seeking additional
briefing from the parties or additional oral argument seems even
more unusual.201 Perhaps, faced with such tremendous and possi-
bly unexpected media backlash in the wake of the courts initial
decision,the Justices felt compelled to clarify their reasoning.202
192.Nelson v.Knight,2012WL 6652747,*16(Iowa 2012).
193.See Nelson, 834N.W.2d at 64,65n.1;see also Eckhoff,supra note 108(charac-
terizing the justices decision to reconsider the case without any new evidence being pre-
sented as a rare move).
194.Nelson, 834N.W.2d at 64,73.
195.Nelson,2012WL 6652747.
196.Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 7381 (Cady, J., concurring).
197.Id. (Cady,J.,concurring).
198.Id. at 7677 (Cady, J., concurring); see also id. at 76n.11,78(Cady,J.,concurring).
199.Id.
200.Id. (Cady,J.,concurring).
201.See Ruling No Better After Further Explanation, IOWA CITY PRESS-CITIZEN,
July 23,2013,2013WLNR 17075823.
202.Id. (questioning whether Chief Justice Cadys motivation for drafting a special con-
currence in the second opinion was related to the extensive criticism that the initial decision
had received,including from various late-night comedians);see also Eckhoff, supra note
108(quoting Ryan Koopmans,a Des Moines attorney, who speculated that some of the
justices were concerned that the public misunderstood their original decision ...[s]o they
clarified it. (internal quotations omitted)); What Others Are Saying: Court Backs the Lusty
Boss Over the Innocent Employee, DES MOINES REGISTER,July 18,2013,2013 WLNR
17496269 (noting that the court had agreed to reconsider its much-mocked ruling).
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The courts second opinion also framed the key question in this
case in a manner that differed from the first opinion in a significant
way:in its initial,December 2012opinion,the court framed the ques-
tion that it faced as whether an employee who has not engaged in
flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the
boss views the employee as an irresistible attraction.203 In its July
2013opinion,the court framed the question somewhat differently
by asking whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious
conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the bosss spouse
views the relationship between the boss and the employee as a threat
to her marriage.204In this way,the court shifted its focus from look-
ing at Knights conduct his potential inability to resist a sexual
relationship with Nelson to a focus on the relationship between
Knight and Nelson.The former framing of the question opened the
door to the type of subjective analysis and gender warfare character-
izations that emerged in many of the media stories regarding this
case,making it easy for reporters and other commentators to blast
Knight for his uncontrollable lust and weak will-power.205 Indeed,
many of the articles that came out in the wake of the courts initial
decision seized on the irresistible language in the opinion as a way
of framing this case.206The question is how one finds a legal or factual
basis for determining whether an employee is sufficiently irresist-
ible to justify her termination (assuming that such irresistible-ness
ever can serve as a justification for termination).In contrast,by fram-
ing the question before the court in terms of the consensual relation-
ship between Nelson and Knight,207the court not only could provide
a stronger factual basis for its decision given the wealth of evidence
regarding this relationship,but it also could tie its decision to rele-
vant precedent precedent that previously had held that termina-
tions related to consensual relationships that cause jealousy do not
violate Title VII.208 This revised framing of the question thus may
have allowed the court to provide a stronger legal and factual basis
203.Nelson v.Knight,2012WL 6652747,*9(Iowa 2012)(emphasis added).
204.Nelson, 834N.W.2d at 69(emphasis added).
205.See, e.g.,The Register Editorial: Unfortunately, Iowa Law Allows Men to Be Jerks,
supra note 184 (Nelson suffered because Knight couldnt control his libido . . . .); Press-
Citizen Editorial Board, supra note 66(arguing that the lone reason Nelson was termi-
nated was because Knight found Nelson sexually attractive and worried that he might
act unprofessionally toward her).
206.See, e.g.,Agence France Presse, supra note 108;Eckhoff, supra note 108;Press-
Citizen Editorial Board, supra note 66;Schwartz, supra note 94;Turley,supra note 2
(titling blog post The Irresistible Woman Meets the Incorrigible Court:Iowa Supreme
Court Issues New Opinion Upholding Firing in Irresistible Attraction Case).
207.See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 6566.
208.Id. at 67.
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for its decision and perhaps one that would seem more palatable
to the public.209
B. Sexiness Sells: The Medias Sensationalism Bias
Given the legal and factual basis for the ultimate result in Nelson,
many in the media still got the Nelson case wrong,even after the
court issued its second decision.The media ignored the complicated
and nuanced background of this case and instead reported the
dispute as one simply involving a woman allegedly fired for being
too hot for her employer. This result stemmed from fundamental
flaws in the medias method of reporting issues and particularly in
reporting on legal issues.
Whereas inaccurate or otherwise skewed reporting by the media
inevitably provides some cause for concern,the notion that the media
gets things wrong likely is not shocking to the average observer of the
news. Indeed, the media seems to make errors all the time oversim-
plifying complexissues,exaggerating events,and sensationalizing
stories at every opportunity.210 As one commentator observed, [m]ass
media will oversimplify and dumb down discussions of public issues,
substitute sensationalism and amusement for deliberation about
public questions,and transform news and politics into forms of enter-
tainment and spectacle.211 Far from the ideal of serious reporting
on important issues,the media has evolved into an amalgamation of
newszak, bonk journalism, infotainment, or simply tabloid news.212
Although it may be accepted wisdom that the media generally
prioritizes entertainment over information,this misplacement of
reporting priorities seems particularly problematic in the context of
legal reporting in stories focusing on the criminal or civil liability
209.At least one major media outlet the New York Times picked up on and accurately
reported about this change in the framing of the question before the court.See Iowa:
Court Reaffirms Dentists Firing of Woman He Found Too Attractive, N.Y.TIMES (July 12,
2013),http:/www.nytimes.com/2013/07/13/us/iowa-court-reaffirms-dentists-firing-of-wom
an-he-found-too-attractive.html?_r=0[http://perma.cc/JY3G-HEJE](reporting that the
courts second opinion had eliminated references to Knights alleged irresistible attraction
to Nelson, instead asking whether Nelson was fired because of the activities of her con-
sensual personal relationship (quoting Nelson,834N.W.2d at 77(Cady,J.,concurring)
(internal quotations omitted))).
210.See JackBalkin,Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Ex-
pression for the Information Society, 79N.Y.U.L.REV.1,30(2004)(citing as one worry
associated with the potential conflict between mass media and democratic self-governance
the fear that the mass media reduce[s] the quality of public discourse in the drive for
higher ratings and the advertising revenues and other profits that come with them.).
211.Id.
212.ROSALIND GILL,GENDER AND THE MEDIA 132(1st ed.2007)(internal quotations
omitted).
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of individuals or corporations.In an empirical project that surveyed
the views of general counsels working at S&P 500companies,law
firm partners,and public relations executives,213 the medias failure
to accurately report on legal issues represented one significant con-
cern (among many others)of those responding.214Many lawyer inter-
viewees complained that the media tends to oversimplify complex
issues and get the facts and details wrong.215 As one participant
noted, [the media] want[s] for me to get down to the sound bite, and
I wanna push back and say, Its not a sound bite.216
The U.S.Supreme Court has decried the extent to which the
media misrepresents and distorts outcomes in matters of law.For
example,shortly after Justice Alito joined the Court,he noted in a
speech that news media typically oversimplifies and sensational-
izes.217 Justice Ginsburg has expressed similar concerns,arguing
that the press often overinterprets unimportant actions, inappro-
priately forecasts outcomes,and overstates the significance of certio-
rari denials.218The headlines chosen by the press,according to Justice
Ginsburg, are more eye-catching than significant.219Equallyvocifer-
ous in his criticism of the media,Justice Scalia has observed that
[t]he press is never going to report judicial opinions accurately ....
Theyre just going to report, who is the plaintiff? Was that a nice
little old lady?And who is the defendant?Was this,you know,
some scuzzy guy?And who won?Was it the good guy that won or
the bad guy?220
Such complaints about the media may seem mundane even when
lobbed by the highest judicial officers in the land.Yet the public is
213.Michele DeStefano Beardslee,Advocacy in the Court of Public Opinion, Install-
ment One: Broadening the Role of Corporate Attorneys, 22GEO.J.LEGAL ETHICS 1259,
1259(2009).
214.See, e.g.,id. at 126869, 128081.
215.Id. at 1281(internal quotations omitted).
216.Id.
217.John Heilprin,Scalia Sees Shift in Courts Role, WASH.POST (Oct.23,2006),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/22/AR2006102200
965.html [http://perma.cc/Y2VR-J6LQ].
218.Frank J.Murray,Ginsburg Finds Full Court Press Lacking in Clarity, WASH.
TIMES (Feb.13,1995),1995WNLR 314319.
219.Id. (quoting Justice Ginsburg)(internal quotations omitted).
220.Heilprin,supra note 217(internal quotations omitted).Justice Thomas has been
even more direct in his vilification of the media,publically referring to members of the
media as smart-aleck commentators, snot-nosed brat[s], talking heads who shout at
each other, and snotty-nosed smirks. Justice Thomas Complains Nation Awash in
Cynicism, CHI.TRIBUNE (Sept.15,1998),http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-09
-15/news/9809150138_1_fight-cynicism-white-house-intern-monica-lewinsky [http://perma
.cc/6MTJ-F9MB](internal quotations omitted).
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so complacent about a media that exaggerates,spins,flattens and
misleads.Particularly when the media reports on stories of legal
significance, perhaps this failure to get it right should be greater
cause for alarm.
C. Bias on Steroids: The Need for a Script in Stories
Involving Women
Whereas the medias tendency simultaneously to hyperbolize
and oversimplify legal stories hardly comes as a surprise,this in-
ability to present the news in an accurate and unbiased manner is
especially pronounced in stories involving female protagonists:news
stories about women invariably focus on their physical appearance
to a far greater degree than stories about their male counterparts.221
According to one scholar, many newspaper editors seem incapable
of printing a story featuring a woman without some evaluation of
her attractiveness,or at least a description of her age and her hair
colour.222 Men,in contrast,rarely are described in terms of their
physical appearance. On those rare occasions when a mans appear-
ance does make its way into a news story,it is generally reported in
a more objective, meta-level manner, such as by discussing the
phenomenon of a male stars sex symbol status, as opposed to the
stars physical appearance itself.223
More disturbing is the manner in which female appearance makes
its way into these stories:regardless of her identity or status,a woman
in the news tends to be represented in one of two ways in terms
of her domestic role or her sexual attractiveness.224 In this vein,
women who fail to conform to the medias physical expectations find
themselves subject to vilification and scorn.225 From the medias
reporting on President Clintons relationship with Monica Lewinsky
(a chorus of ugh how could he, rather than any political or ethical
debate about [the Presidents behavior]),226 to the British presss
vicious attacking of Duchess Sarah Fergusons (Fergies) appear-
ance (including a telephone poll inviting male participants to rate
whether they would rather date . . . Fergie or a goat),227to attacks on
actress Kate Winslet following her appearance in the movie Titanic
221.See GILL,supra note 212, at 11516.
222.Id. at 115.
223.Id. at 116.
224.Id. at 115-16.
225.See id. at 116 (The viciousness with which women are attacked if they do not meet
the normative modes of attractiveness demanded by the press is chilling.).
226.Id.
227.GILL,supra note 212,at 116.
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(printing diet plans for her to follow and dubbing her Titanic Kate,
instead of focusing on the merits of her Oscar nominated perfor-
mance),228 this focus on female physical appearance over substance
seems to apply across subject matters.
Surprisingly,even well established women,whose place in the
public eye seemingly has no link to their appearance,find them-
selves judged by these same beauty standards:a study of female
parliamentarians in Britain,South Africa,and Australia revealed
numerous examples of a media fixated on the appearance of these
female politicians,229 with at least one respondent commenting:
[W]omen are never the right age. We are too young, were too old.
We are too thin, were too fat. We wear too much makeup, we dont
wear enough. We are too flashy in our dress, we dont take enough
care. There isnt a thing we can do that is right.230
Closer to home,former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton received
similar,appearance-focused coverage both during and after her run
for the White House: on the presidential campaign trail, Clintons
appearance was a common topic of conversation in coverage of her
campaign,231 with observers commenting on everything [f]rom the
color of her suit to her latest . . . hairstyle.232 Even one of Clintons
male rivals on the campaign trail,former Senator Fred Thompson,
noted the different standard to which Clinton was held and sympa-
thized that Clinton has to look matronly without looking beautiful,
tough without looking harsh.233 During her tenure as Secretary of
State, Clintons decision to appear wearing glasses (as opposed to
contact lenses) and with no cosmetics other than lipstick drew na-
tional attention,along with a front-and-center place on the well-
known Drudge Report.234 Whereas some in the media expressed
outrage that Clintons appearance without makeup might qualify as
228.Id.
229.Id. at 117(citing study).
230.Id. at 11718.
231.Emily Friedman,Is Clinton Scrutinized About Her Looks Too Much, ABC NEWS
(Jan.28,2008),http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/Vote2008/story?id=4193461[http:/perma
.cc/A4FL-XFRA].
232.Id.
233.Id.
234.Martha T.Moore,Focus on Hillary Clintons Appearance Sparks Criticism, USA
TODAY(May 10,2012,9:02AM),http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story
/2012-05-09/hillary-rodham-clinton/54860282/1 [http://perma.cc/E4Z5-P2BU];see also
Erin Gloria Ryan,What Were Really Talking About When We Talk About Hillary Clinton
Without Makeup, JEZEBEL (May 9,2012,11:20 AM),http://jezebel.com/5908712/what
-were-really-talking-about-when-we-talk-about-hillary-clinton-without-makeup [http://
perma.cc/9VK8-HTE2](reporting on the Drudge Reports shaming of Hillary Clinton).
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news, others defended Clintons appearance in these same gendered
terms arguing that she looked fresh-faced in the pictures and
that she looked good in the photos.235 Rather than focus on the
content of the visit during which these photos were taken a diplo-
matic stop in Bangladesh these stories continued the pattern of
characterizing a woman in the news according to her appearance.236
Despite working in a profession in which physical appearance
seems to lackany relevance,even women in the military find them-
selves confronted by a beauty bias albeit, perhaps in a manner
somewhat different from that faced by other women in the news:one
female soldier recently found herself receiving the brunt of a female
superiors ire after her photo appeared in a military publication show-
ing her wearing carefully applied eyeliner and lip gloss.237According
to the superior officer, the photo undermine[d] the rest of the mes-
sage [about gender parity in combat](and may even make people
ask if breaking a nail is considered hazardous duty).238 In this of-
ficers view and contrary to the conventional wisdom (in which
those who satisfy societal standards of physical beauty find them-
selves with many advantages as compared to other less attractive
peers)239 ugly women are perceived as competent while pretty
women are perceived as having used their looks to get ahead.240
Thus,to a great degree,the women portrayed in these stories find
themselves in a no-win situation:women who are not sufficiently
physically attractive face an onslaught of criticism and belittle-
ment,241 but those who seem too beautiful may find themselves
stereotyped and written off in other ways.242 In the words of one
235.Ryan,supra note 234(internal quotations omitted).
236.See Daily Mail: Hillary Forgets Her Makeup?,FOX NEWS (May 7,2012),http://
nation.foxnews.com/hillary-clinton/2012/05/07/hillary-forgets-her-makeup [http://perma
.cc/PYA7-2LV6].
237.Meltzer,supra note 92.
238.Id. (internal quotations omitted).
239.Toledano,supra note 11, at 28384; see also Kimmel,supra note 11 (defining
lookism as the preferential treatment given to those who conform to social standards
of beauty).
240.Meltzer,supra note 92(internal quotations omitted);see also Brown,supra note
11, at 58 (Attractive women are more likely to be subjected to stereotypes,harassment,
and scrutiny,and are often pigeonholed in jobs that encourage them to use their looks
for gain without regard to any other skills they possess.).
241.See supra notes 22325 and accompanying text.
242.See Brown,supra note 11, at 58 (People generally have higher expectations of
beautiful people,and when [they]fail to measure up,they face greater consequences for
their failure.[Attractive people]may also face adversity in hiring and promoting because
their intelligence is often doubted,and people have less desire for future interactions
with attractive people of their own sex.).
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commentator, [y]ou have to be beautiful to matter, but beauty can
and will be used against you.243
These no-win restrictions that women face with respect to their
appearance actually extend much further than skin deep.In creat-
ing a dichotomy for portraying women in the news,the media seems
focused not only on their subjects physical beauty, but also often
amplifies appearance into behavior:women not only must fit into a
particular box with respect to the way that they look, but they also
must fall into a predetermined role related to their sexuality (or lack
thereof). Here too, women fall into one of two roles either that of
the Madonna (pure,pristine,and sexually muted),or that of the
whore (sexually promiscuous and often vilified).244 From popular
music,245to literature,246to movies,247 to childrens animated films,248
women are portrayed as either virtuous and pure or as desire-driven
and cunning,with virtually no room for any grey area in between.
This crabbed view regarding how women are portrayed in public
extends beyond fictional depictions in books,movies,and the like.
Indeed, real women portrayed in the news may find themselves
shoved into this same storyline.Few events in recent media history
illustrate the Madonna/whore dichotomy faced by women in the news
more than the late 1980s sexscandal involving televangelist Jim
Bakker and former church secretary Jessica Hahn.249
In December 1980,renowned televangelist Jim Bakker,head of
the Praise the Lord (PTL)Ministries,had a sexual encounter with
former church secretary Jessica Hahn in a Florida hotel room.250
243.Meltzer,supra note 92(internal quotations omitted).
244.Judith Olans Brown et al.,The Mythogenesis of Gender: Judicial Images of Women
in Paid and Unpaid Labor, 6UCLA WOMENS L.J.457,461,461n.19, 462 (1996) (Mythic
generalizations often reduce women to one of two archetypes: madonna or whore.).
245.SeeMadonnaWhore Complex,TVTROPES.COM,http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki
.php/Main/MadonnaWhoreComplex[http://perma.cc/6W4A-GVWJ](documenting use of
this dichotomy by Taylor Swift,Madonna,Justin Timberlake,and others).
246.See id. (citing such classics as PORTRAIT OF AN ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN,A TALE
OF TWO CITIES,AND TESS OF THE DURBERVILLES).
247.See id. For example,when the topic of sexis brought up in THE BREAKFAST CLUB,
Claire narrates, Well, if you say you havent, youre a prude. If you say you have youre a
slut. Its a trap. You want to but you cant, and when you do you wish you didnt, right?
Id. (noting similar examples from AMERICAN PIE,CRUEL INTENTIONS,and SATURDAY
NIGHT FEVER).
248.See id. (finding examples of the Madonna-Whore complexpresented,inter alia, in
both SNOW WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS and SLEEPING BEAUTY, where the good prin-
cess is pure and virginal and the evil villainess is an older woman with more sexuality).
249.See Joshua Gamson,Jessica Hahn, Media Whore: Sex Scandals and Female
Publicity, 18CRITICAL STUD.IN MEDIA COMMCN 157,157(June 2001)(discussing,inter
alia, Hahns portrayal in the media in the wake of her sex scandal with Bakker).
250.See id.; see also Leslie Berkman & Peter H.King,Felt Like Discarded Hamburger: 
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When news of their encounter became public in 1987,Bakker and
Hahn each told different stories about what had happened during
this encounter:according to the original version of the story (the
version told both by Hahn and by the national press),Hahn had
been a modest,20-year-old woman who initially cleaned toilets at
the church, eventually became the churchs secretary, and exhibited
total devotion to her job,including praying by phone with those in
need.251Despite her physical attractiveness,Hahn had only been on
a handful of dates.252Her sexeducation had come from library books
as opposed to life experience, and she had vowed to remain a virgin
until marriage.253
In the immediate wake of the scandal, when Hahns relation-
ship with Bakker first became public, Hahns portrayal in the media
epitomized the innocent Madonna: she was depicted as the ruined-
innocent,good-girl character:weeping after a phone call to her
parents . . . reading the Bible . . . demure and unprepossessing.254
She claimed never to have wanted money from Bakker as a result of
this encounter (despite eventually collecting a settlement of $265,000
from his church),255 but rather claimed only to have wanted an op-
portunity to vent her grievances and perhaps receive an apology
from Bakker.256
Hahns reprieve in the media limelight, however, proved to be
short lived.The media soon was reporting on the large financial
settlement that Hahn had received and implied that good girls,
even if they do actually have sex, and even if theyre forced to, dont
get paid for it . . . .257 The press mentioned her shiny lipstick and
Porsche sunglasses, her boots, tight jeans and tight sweaters.258
Eventually,after the million-dollar payout for her appearance in
Playboy became public,the media and its consumers quickly aban-
doned any allegiance with or sympathy for Hahn.259 In the eyes of
both the media and the public at large,Hahn became just another
loose woman, a seductress, willing to sell her chastity to the
highest bidder.260 Indeed, in the words of one observer, it[] [was] as
Womans Story of Bakker Tryst Told for First Time, L.A.TIMES (Mar.27,1987),http://
article.latimes.com/1987-03-27/news/mn-315_1_jim-bakker [http:/perma.cc/Y9B4-H4BH].
251.Gamson,supra note 249,at 164.
252.Id.
253.Id. (internal quotations omitted).
254.Id. (internal quotations omitted).
255.Id. at 165.
256.See id. at 15758; see also Berkman & King,supra note 250.
257.Gamson, supra note 249,at 165.
258.Id. at 164.
259.See id. at 165.
260.See id.
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though Hahn reached behind her head and slowly peeled off the face
of the virginal church secretary to reveal gasp! her evil, nympho-
maniacal, come-and-get-it twin.261
In many ways, Hahns transformation was typical. This need to
force Hahn into a particular persona,victim or vamp,falls squarely
within the medias usual modus operandi.262 As one commentator
has observed, this dichotomy this axis of sexually pure or sexu-
al[ly] ruined, of virgin or whore, of loose woman or bad girl . . .
continues to be[] one of the central axes along which womens posi-
tioning in the public sphere has run.263 Hahns ability to straddle
both stereotypes, to act as both [g]ood girl and her evil twin, trust-
ing,naïve ruined woman and calculating,sex-drenched golddigger,
victim and vamp, has cast her as what some have called the best
summary we have of the sex-scandal icon.264
Whereas the medias desire to characterize Hahn as fitting into
one of two boxes might not come as a surprise given the medias
tendency to oversimplify and typecast,the speed and fierceness with
which the media and the public turned on Hahn rejecting her claims
of innocence and virginity and chastising her as a loose woman and
media whore does raise questions. Almost from the moment that
Hahns encounter with Bakker became public, one sensed the media
struggling with how to characterize her tale:even the earliest
descriptions of Hahn swing between the dog-loving, Bible-reading,
small-town virgin and her alter ego,the big-haired,gum-chomping,
knowing tease.265 From this perspective, it would not take much
merely the slightest push in one direction or the other,toward
Madonna or whore to vault Hahn more permanently into one of
these two camps.
Admittedly,Hahn made it easy for members of the media to
describe her in hyperbolic terms.She provided ample fodder for the
press to cast her as either the [p]ower-hungry temptress of power-
ful man (busty, licking her lips)266 or the chaste beauty ruined by
powerful man (young,smooth skinned,eyes cast down but glancing
up with hints of desire) . . . .267 Yet,it is possible that Hahn,like
most women,was a woman with a complexpersonality and nuanced
261.See id. ([A]fter brief press time as a good girl,Hahn rapidly shape-shifted to a
self-promoting sexual object.).
262.See id. at 158 (On its own, while certainly appalling, the persistence of sexual objec-
tification,sexual double standards,and a virgin-whore dichotomy is not surprising news.).
263.Gamson,supra note 249,at 158(quotations in original).
264.Id.
265.Id. at 164.
266.Id. at 158.
267.Id.
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sexuality and was not simply a one-dimensional cartoon character.
By shoving Hahn consecutively into these two boxes,first that of
virgin,then that of whore,the media oversimplified what was likely
a much more complextale.
In this way, the medias portrayal of Hahn can provide insight
into the flawed coverage of Knight v. Nelson.Perhaps,just as the
media seemed so eager to cement Hahn into a particular mold,so
too did they desire similarly to define Nelson to characterize
Nelson as either Madonna or whore. Yet Nelson also did not fit
cleanly into either of these categories.As a (mostly)passive target
of Knights amorous proclamations the mere recipient of his ex-
plicit communications268 Nelson hardly could be characterized as
a whore.Knight,not Nelson,seemed to initiate and foster their inap-
propriate relationship.269 At the same time, however, Nelsons behav-
ior seemed not quite virginal.As the Iowa Supreme Court repeatedly
noted in its opinion, not only did Nelson never object to Knights
overtures,but she also apparently did not even deem them harass-
ing in nature.270 Perhaps the court believed that a true virgin would
have responded less passively to such graphic statements from a
man other than her husband or partner.271
Thus,faced with a protagonist who could not fit squarely into
a predetermined role,the media found itself faced with a choice
regarding how it wanted to characterize Nelson in this story and
it chose the Madonna persona:whether driven by an inherent
sympathy for the underdog plaintiff,272 by a desire to tell a more
sensational story,273 or by other forces altogether,the media by and
268.Nelson v. Knight, 834 N.W.2d 64, 6566 (Iowa 2013) (noting the sexual nature
of several instances of communication between Nelson and Knight).
269.See id. at 66.
270.See id. at 65,67,72n.7.
271.See id.;see also Simmons v.Miami Valley Trotting,Inc.,2006WL 1000076,*5(S.D.
Ohio 2006) ([P]laintiff Singleton did not tell Nixon his comments were unwelcome . . . .).
Of course,the inherent power differential between Knight as employer and Nelson as
employee may well have inhibited Nelsons response to Knights comments. Yet the court
made much of the fact that even after Knight terminated her employment,Nelson never
alleged that she had felt bothered by Knights statements and simply was frightened to
speakout.Nelson,834N.W.2d at 72.To the contrary,even in the context of pursuing her
gender discrimination suit, Nelson never claimed that she was offended by Knights
communications or that she viewed such statements as harassing or unwelcome.Id.
272.See Laura Beth Nielsen & Aaron Beim,Media Misrepresentation: Title VII, Print
Media, and Public Perceptions of Discrimination Litigation, 15STAN.L.& POLY REV.
237, 243 (2004) (By portraying employment discrimination lawsuits as those in which
plaintiffs consistently and uniformly prevail,the media may be contributing to its reader-
ships formation of an expectation of a certain outcome that is rarely met.).
273.See Balkin,supra note 210, at 30 (Mass media will oversimplify and dumb down
discussions ofpublic issues [and]substitute sensationalism andamusement for deliberation
about public questions . . . .); see also Heilprin,supra note 217 ([P]eople understand the
courts through a news media that typically oversimplifies and sensationalizes.).
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large opted to portray the Nelson case as one in which a (largely)
innocent employee suffered because Knight couldnt control his
libido . . . .274 Yet by forcing Nelson into a cloak that didnt quite fit,
the media inevitably skewed its coverage of her story.It could not
report on Nelsons passivity in the face of Knights graphic overtures
without tarnishing Nelsons pure and pristine appearance. It could
not describe the legal nuance in the Iowa courts decision the
precedent permitting terminations based on relationships that
create jealousy,275 or the courts surprise at Nelsons failure to allege
sexual harassment,276 or the limited scope of the opinion itself 277
without weakening the power of the broader narrative.Better to
portray a simple tale of a female employee twice wronged first by
her lust-ridden employer and then by an out-of-touch,misogynistic
court than to convey the true complexities that underlie this case.
D. A Perfect Storm: Media Sensationalism & Gender Stereotyping
Leads to Skewed Reporting in Sex Discrimination Cases
Whereas the Nelson case provides one insight into how the media
need to oversimplify and stereotype female protagonists leads to
skewed reporting and misinformation,this case sadly represents but
one example of a much broader trend.In fact,as already discussed,
the medias need to place female protagonists in a particular box
(either pure and pristine or sexually promiscuous),combined with
the medias general tendency to sensationalize and oversimplify, may
lead to skewed reporting in a whole class of stories those involving
sexdiscrimination claims brought by female plaintiffs.
In their 2004study of print media accounts of employment dis-
crimination cases from 1990to 2000,Laura Beth Nielsen and Aaron
Beim found that the print media depicts employment discrimination
plaintiffs in a significantly more favorable light than reality war-
rants.278Their research indicated that the manner in which the media
portrays outcomes in sexdiscrimination cases vastly misrepresents
reality in a manner highly favorable to discrimination plaintiffs.279Spe-
cifically,among other misrepresentations,the media depicts higher
274.The Register Editorial: Unfortunately, Iowa Law Allows Men to Be Jerks, supra
note 184.Indeed,as previously mentioned,at least one editorial framed this case in pre-
cisely those terms.What Others Are Saying: Court Backs the Lusty Boss over the Innocent
Employee,supra note 188.
275.See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 6869.
276.See supra notes 6566 and accompanying text.
277.See Nelson,834N.W.2d at 65.
278.See Nielsen & Beim,supra note 272,at 239.
279.See id. at 239,257.
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win rates and higher award amounts for plaintiffs in these suits
than is actually the case in federal court outcomes.280
Nielsen and Beim found that during the period relevant to their
study, plaintiffs were portrayed in the media as prevailing in
[eighty-five percent] of all adjudicated cases (meaning that in those
media stories that specified a winner,plaintiffs prevailed eighty-five
percent of the time).281 The actual win rate for plaintiffs in district
courts during this period,however,was thirty-two percent,less than
half of the plaintiff win rate reflected in media accounts.282When the
study focused specifically on media coverage of jury trials (a sample
which itself is skewed with respect to outcomes,given the large
number of cases that settle),the media reported plaintiff victories
in almost ninety-eight percent of the trials covered,as compared to an
actual win rate of almost forty-one percent for jury trial plaintiffs.283
Media reports of discrimination cases tried as bench trials similarly
depicted prevailing plaintiffs in sixty-eight percent ofall reports of con-
cluded cases,as compared to an actual win rate of twenty percent for
discrimination plaintiffs who opted for a bench trial.284
Nielsen and Beim also found that the media inflated the size of
awards in employment discrimination cases during this period.In
stories regarding jury trials, the median jury award reported . . .
[was]$1,100,000.285 The actual median jury award in discrimina-
tion cases during this period was $150,000,less than seven times
the reported amount.286 As the authors of this study concluded,
[t]hese data demonstrate dramatic differences between media ac-
counts of employment discrimination cases and the actual dynamics
and outcomes of litigation.287 The authors worried that [b]y por-
traying employment discrimination lawsuits as those in which plain-
tiffs consistently and uniformly prevail,the media may be contribut-
ing to its readerships formation of an expectation of an outcome that
is rarely met.288
Admittedly, Nielsen and Beims focus was on discrimination cases
generally,as opposed to solely on cases involving sexdiscrimination.289
Yet statistics indicate that sex discrimination claims consistently
280.See id. at 251.
281.See id.
282.See id.
283.See id. at 252.
284.See Nielsen & Beim,supra note 272,at 253.
285.See id.
286.See id.
287.Id. at 257.
288.Id. at 243.
289.See id. at 239.
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have made up a significant portion of all charges filed with the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),comprising
roughly one-third of all charges filed with the agency between 1992
and 2014.290 Whereas there is admittedly a difference between
charges merely filed with the EEOC and cases that eventually make
their way into district court (i.e.,the latter being the basis of Nielsen
and Beims analysis), there is no reason to believe that sex discrimi-
nation charges settle or are otherwise resolved at any greater or
lesser rate than other types of charges.Thus,one can assume that
Nielsen and Beims findings regarding misrepresentations with re-
spect to discrimination claims will generally be similarly reflected
in any data with respect to sexclaims specifically.
By carrying over this unrealistic expectation specifically into
lawsuits involving sex discrimination cases in which women most
frequently serve as plaintiffs291 the media not only may be skewing
the publics understanding of these types of claims, but also, as
discussed below,may be altering expectations regarding the role of
women in the workplace more generally.Indeed,by portraying the
vast majority of female plaintiffs in these cases as innocent victims
to an extent that belies reality,the media continues to exacerbate
the stratification that women already face in the workplace and
beyond: true victims of sex discrimination must comport with the
image of the Madonna,pure and pristine,whereas those women
who happen to fall outside of this boxmay be treated more harshly
and vilified.
IV.HIGH STAKES ERRORS:THE RAMIFICATIONS OF MEDIA BIAS IN
STORIES INVOLVING WORKPLACE SEX DISCRIMINATION
As already noted,there is nothing shocking about the proposition
that the media misrepresents,hyperbolizes,sensationalizes and over-
simplifies.Although many may wish that the media would do a better
job particularly when reporting on legal matters the fact that
290.See Charge Statistics FY 1992 Through FY 1996,EQUAL EMPT OPPORTUNITY
COMMN,http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges-a.cfm [http://perma.cc
/X2E4-L4GY];Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2013,EQUAL EMPT OPPORTUNITY
COMMN,http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm [http://perma.cc
/E2ZL-D76Y].
291.Rachel H.Yarkon,Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawyers: Negotiated Settlement
of Gender Discrimination Claims Arising from Termination of Employment, 2 HARV.
NEGOT.L.REV.165,167(1997) (citing attorneys assertion that a majority of plaintiffs in
gender discrimination cases are female employees).But see Martha Chamallas,Writing
About Sexual Harassment: A Guide to the Literature, 4UCLA WOMENS L.J.37,38(1993)
(noting that women serve as plaintiffs in the majority of sexual harassment cases,but that
men frequently bring gender discrimination claims).
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these general problems carry over into the legal context likely comes
as no surprise to the average consumer of the news.Indeed,the
medias very ability to skew the publics understanding of women in
the workplace,particularly when it comes to claims of sexdiscrimi-
nation,flows from the fact that most lay individuals have quite
limited knowledge of employment law.For example,most individuals
fail to appreciate the meaning of the employment at will doctrine,
which permits an employer to terminate a workers employment at
any time, for any reason.292 When members of the public hear
stories about employees being treated unfairly,many automatically
assume that such conduct is illegal.293
It is equally unsurprising to discover that the media often por-
trays female protagonists in a manner that favors stereotype and
caricature over complexity and precision. The Madonna/whore
labels encompass roles that have long-been associated with women
both inside and outside of the workplace.294 Whether the subject is
a celebrity,a political figure,or any ordinary citizen,the media de-
faults to descriptions grounded in a womans physical appearance
or sexuality.295
When the media not only glosses over details or otherwise
skews the facts in legal stories involving female plaintiffs,but also
adheres to this Madonna/whore dichotomy,the errors have a broad
impact on women,both within the workplace and beyond.By telling
the stories about discrimination cases in a way that is inaccurate,
and that further perpetuates stereotypes regarding the role of women,
the media may unwittingly be altering how the broader public views
women both in and out of work.Moreover,this change in how the
broader public understands the roles of women may have several
significant ramifications.
First,inaccuracies in the media regarding how women are por-
trayed (i.e.,as Madonna or whore,as physically desirable or use-
less), may impact the publics priorities with respect to policy and
legislation.The media has a direct impact on how lay individuals
understand the law.296 As one legal scholar has observed, [m]uch of
292.Corbett,supra note 11,at 659.
293.Id. (noting that people who hear stories about appearance-based discrimination
often assume that such conduct is illegal,even when the conduct does not violate Title
VII or any other statute);cf. Nelson v.Knight, 834 N.W.2d 64, 73 (Iowa 2013) ([T]he
issue before [the court]is not whether a jury could find that Dr.Knight treated Nelson
badly ...[but rather]only if a genuine fact issue exists as to whether Dr.Knight
engaged in unlawful gender discrimination . . . .).
294.See supra Section III.C.
295.See supra Section III.C.
296.Nielsen & Beim,supra note 272,at 257.
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what Americans know,or only thinkthey know,about legal issues
comes from media portrayals.297 The media impacts which issues
their audiences take seriously:by ignoring some problems and paying
attention to others,the media helps to shape the legal and policy
priorities of the general public.298 When the media consistently re-
peats certain stories and frameworks,individuals come to under-
stand the law primarily through these frameworks especially if the
individuals are starting from a point of relative naïvetéand thus are
less capable of challenging what is reported.299 If the story that
media consumers see again and again is one where female plaintiffs
almost always prevail in employment discrimination lawsuits and
receive enormous damage awards,and one in which female plain-
tiffs must fit into a particular template with respect to their appear-
ance and sexuality,this may alter the lens through which employers,
human resource professionals,employees,judges,and other policy
makers view the workplace.300 Rather than being viewed as an
arena where discrimination claims are rare and where such claims
are evaluated objectively according to the facts,the workplace
becomes akin to a battlefield,where employers must remain on
guard against unfounded claims by scheming vixens (as well as
perhaps some legitimate claims brought by truly victimized females),
both of which will cost the employer dearly.301 An employer focused
on maintaining this defensive crouch may prioritize guarding against
discrimination liability in an unnecessarilyhigh position and overlook
other important tasks that are key to running a successful business.302
297.Id. at 258(quoting Deborah L.Rhode,Legal Scholarship, 115HARV.L.REV.1327,
1347(2002)(internal quotations omitted)).
298.Id. at 258.
299.Id.
300.Id. at 260.
301.See Jon Hyman,How Much Does It Cost to Defend an Employment Lawsuit?,
WORKFORCE.COM (May 14,2013),http:/www.workforce.com/blogs/3-the-practical-employer
/post/how-much-does-it-cost-to-defend-an-employment-lawsuit [http://perma.cc/4SUL
-3FEL] ([T]he employer can expect to spend a total of $175,000 to $250,000to take a
case to a jury verdict at trial.); see also Susan M.Heathfield,Prevent Employment Dis-
crimination and Lawsuits,ABOUT.COM,http://humanresources.about.com/od/discrimi
nation/qt/prevent-employment-discrimination.htm [http://perma.cc/FSS5-6J9R] (last
visited Dec.11,2015)(discussing how,in addition to the average defense cost of $250,000
and jury verdict of $200,000,an employer incurs other types of costs,such as distraction
of staff,loss of employee morale,reputation harm, and attorneys fees).
302.See Susan Bisom-Rapp,Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance in
Employment Discrimination Law Practice,26FLA.ST.U.L.REV.959,964,985(1999)
(describing a host of litigation avoidance strategies used by employers); see also Catherine
Rampell,More Workers Complain of Bias on the Job, a Trend Linked to Widespread
Layoffs, N.Y.TIMES (Jan.11,2011),http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/business/12bias
.html [http://perma.cc/VH2Y-4FH7](discussing the increase in discrimination charges dur-
ing difficult economic times and citing management lawyers observation that employers
take potential discrimination litigation into account in structuring layoffs and workforce
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In addition to impacting the priorities that are set with respect
to the relative importance of womens issues, these misrepresenta-
tions of women in the public eye can also have a concrete impact on
policies and practices in the business world:when the media paints
a picture in which discrimination plaintiffs overwhelmingly prevail,
and then characterizes the female plaintiffs who may initiate these
cases as either innocent victims or conniving vamps,it fuels an
excessive fear among employers regarding employment discrimina-
tion lawsuits.303This excessive fear,in turn,may have a direct impact
on personnel decisions who to hire and who to fire.304 Indeed,re-
search has shown that human resource professionals often over-
estimate and thus overcompensate for the risk of liability from
employment-related litigation.305 In some cases,these perceived
threats of liability might discourage employers from hiring women
(or members of other protected groups)out of fear of potential lia-
bility if adverse action must be taken against such individuals down
the road.306In other words,employers may be less likely to hire women
if they fear that a female employee who later is fired,or denied a
raise,or misses out on a promotion is likely not only to sue for sex
discrimination,but also to win (and to receive a significant award).
In this way,the skewed image of women presented by the media
may have an impact on the composition of the workforce.307
This increased fear of liability that many employers may have
regarding having women in the workplace may also create a market
for certain types of liability insurance. Employment Practices Liabil-
ity Insurance (EPLI) insures employers against liability for em-
ployee claims of wrongful employment practices, including wrongful
termination.308Thus,media accounts that toutvictories bydiscrimina-
tion plaintiffs beyond those reflected in reality or that publicize im-
probable substantial awards,may create an artificial market for
this expensive product.309This fear of liability also likely promotes job
reductions).Indeed,employers may even retain underperforming employees to avoid a
potential claim of discrimination.See Hyman,supra note 301 (Most employers, if acting
rationally,will chose [sic]to retain an employee instead of assuming the riskof a $250,000
legal bill with an uncertain outcome.).
303.Nielsen & Beim,supra note 272,at 258.
304.See id. at 261.
305.See id.
306.See id.;see also Jessica Fink,Unintended Consequences: How Antidiscrimination
Litigation Increases Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38N.M.L.REV.333,34546
(2008)(describing the extent to which Title VII litigation may create disincentive for em-
ployers to hire workers from protected classes).
307.Nielsen & Beim,supra note 272,at 261.
308.Id. at 262.
309.Id. Although outside the scope of this Article,one area for future inquiry might
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security for the human resources staff within a company:employers
who believe that they are merely one employment decision away
from the receiving end of a risky and high-stakes discrimination
lawsuit are perhaps likely to feel a greater need to retain the human
resources professionals charged with guiding these decisions.310
Finally,media distortions regarding both the role of women in
the workplace and their potential to prevail in discrimination law-
suits may have a substantial negative impact on workplace morale.311
Research indicates that workers who claim to have experienced
discrimination in the workplace often are viewed by colleagues as
troublemakers.312In the context of race discrimination complaints,
for example,workers who claim to have experienced adverse treat-
ment due to their race frequently are viewed as making excuses
for their own workplace deficiencies or as trying to use the legal
system to grab an unearned cash award.313Notably,this type of nega-
tive response toward complaining individuals has been found to
occur even when clear evidence indicates that the complaining indi-
viduals,in fact,had experienced discrimination.314
A female employee who complains that she has experienced sex
discrimination due to her appearance may not only find herself
shoved into a particular box labeled as the innocent victim or the
conniving temptress but also may be seen as creating this prob-
lem,perhaps by dressing in a certain manner or devoting excessive
time to honing her feminine appearance.Indeed,Nelson and similar
too hot cases support this blame the victim mentality: the Nelson
court noted a factual dispute regarding whether Nelsons attire was
actually too tight and revealing or whether it was appropriate, as
Nelson alleged.315Media stories regarding Lauren Odes,terminated
wholesale lingerie employee,raised similar concerns,discussing
whether her simple tee-shirt and jeggings had been deemed too
distracting for her employer.316 In neither of these discussions did
the court, or the media, assert that Nelson or Odess choice of cloth-
ing was irrelevant to the discussion that no matter what attire
involve determining whether businesses that employ a greater percentage of women or
members of other protected groups tend to maintain more robust EPLI.
310.This same argument likely would apply with respect to the job security of in-
house and/or outside employment counsel.
311.Nielsen & Beim,supra note 272,at 262.
312.Fink,supra note 306,at 341(internal quotations omitted).
313.Nielsen & Beim,supra note 272,at 262(internal quotations omitted).
314.See id. at 262 n.110 ([W]hite women and people of color are loathe to define a
negative outcome as discrimination even when the event objectively amounts to dis-
crimination.).
315.See Nelson v.Knight, 834 N.W.2d 6465, 65 n.3 (Iowa 2013).
316.See Lauren Odes Too Hot Appearance,supra note 89.
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either woman chose to wear,it would not justify adverse treatment
from her employer.As other employees (particularly female employ-
ees)observe this dynamic,in which a colleague claims to have been
penalized due to her gender,and then is herself characterized as
possibly creating her own problems,they not only may hesitate
before voicing their own concerns about adverse treatment at work,
but also may question whether their physical appearance is under-
mining their ability to succeed in their jobs.
CONCLUSION
Although it is easy to downplay the role of the media in shaping
public views to write the media off as no more than an infotainment-
providing distraction the media in fact plays a substantial role in
setting the agenda for public discourse,informing citizens of facts
that will shape their beliefs,and promoting the policies and prac-
tices that employers,judges,and legislators may adopt.Significant
negative ramifications may arise when women in the public eye are
portrayed in a misleading or otherwise inaccurate manner when
evaluations of their physical attractiveness imbues articles in which
appearance otherwise should play no role,or when their sexuality
is generalized into one of two roles:Madonna or whore.The Nelson
case presents a prime example of how easy it is for the media,through
even minimal skewing of its coverage,to drastically alter the way
in which a story is portrayed,which often results in misdirected ire
from the public at large.
To be sure,the actual decision in Nelson provided much to cri-
tique:one could understandably and reasonably lament a decision
that allows the jealousy of an employers spouse to justify an em-
ployees termination (particularly when the employee played a
lesser,more passive role in fostering the relationship that led to the
jealousy). One could also question whether the courts attempt to
limit this case by placing so much emphasis on the consensual
nature of the relationship between Knight and Nelson accurately
reflects the realities of most worksites,where subordinate employ-
ees might hesitate before objecting to or deterring the advances of
a boss or other superior.Indeed,if carefully and accurately reported,
a case like Nelson could open the door to important,broader discus-
sions:discussions about gender dynamics in the office and the role
of women in the workplace;discussions about how employers and
employees properly should navigate relationships that extend beyond
the workplace;and discussions about the stereotypes and standards
that society unwittingly imposes on employees based on their sex.
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Yet, by oversimplifying this case by portraying it as one simply
about a lust-filled male employer and his blameless,pure female
employee the media obscured the relevance of these other points.
Whereas many portrayed Nelson as an example of an out-of-touch
court gone awry,perhaps the case could better be understood as a
missed opportunity for engaging in these important conversations.
